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From the Editor
After an intense period of internal reorganization, Parameters opens
its long-awaited Winter 2018–2019 issue with a Special Commentary,
“Civil-Military Relations and Today’s Policy Environment” by Thomas
Garner. Garner suggests US civil-military relations may have come to a
crossroads where the rift between American citizens and their military
has grown too great to be ignored any longer.
Our first forum, Coercion: New Means & Methods, features two
articles that discuss underexplored ways of achieving strategic coercion.
The first contribution, “Social Media Warriors: Leveraging a New
Battlespace” by Buddhika Jayamaha and Jahara Matisek, explains how
certain hostile parties have created a new battlespace consisting of the
internet, social media, and other means of communication to foment
social and political discontent within Western-style democracies. No
less novel, David Katz’s contribution, “Multidimensionality: Rethinking
Power Projection for the 21st Century,” explains how American military
strategists might incorporate multidimensional power projection into
their planning processes to counter gray-zone adversaries.
The second forum, Technological Innovation: Problems & Prospects,
addresses the double-edged nature of technology. The first article,
“High-Energy Laser Weapons: Overpromising Readiness” by Ash
Rossiter, discusses some of the facts and fictions associated with modern
laser weapons within the context of today’s great-power competition. An
essential point in this discussion is how the excessive promises of those
responsible for developing (and selling) high-tech weapons can severely
undermine military readiness. In quite a different vein, the forum’s second
article, “Innovation Tradecraft: Sustaining Technological Advantage in
the Future Army” by Adam Jay Harrison, Bharat Rao, and Bala Mulloth,
identifies the components needed to build an innovation ecosystem. This
ecosystem would include organizational culture, awareness of emerging
technologies, a capacity for leveraging resources, and a strategy for
absorbing external information. Ideally, such an ecosystem would help
channel technological innovation in positive directions while reducing
bureaucratic inertia.
Our third forum, Technological Change & War’s Nature, consists of a
contribution by a historical figure of some renown. The article entitled
“Profession at the Crossroads” written by Donn A. Starry while he was
still a lieutenant colonel. Among other things, Starry reveals how he and
his contemporaries understood the relationship between technological
change and the nature of war. His views provide an interesting contrast
with those of today. This contribution is separated by nearly 50 years; yet
it deals with a timeless and, for the military professional, a fundamentally
inescapable question. ~AJE
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Special Commentary

Civil-Military Relations and
Today’s Policy Environment
Thomas N. Garner
©2019 Thomas N. Garner

T

he 67th Annual Student Conference on US Affairs conducted
at the United States Military Academy brought college students
together from all over the country to discuss a variety of
issues related to confronting inequality. While this event usually drives
robust debate, the table on civil-military relations arguably had the most
interesting outcome. These participants discussed whether the military
should be representative of society as a driver of trust and legitimacy.1
The table of seven males and ten females, from 17 different colleges,
came to a conclusion that dealt more with the military’s relationship to,
than its representation of, society.
The students framed the civil-military relationship on the factors
of trust and legitimacy and identified three issues facing civil-military
relations: inadequate handling of veterans’ affairs, ineffectiveness of
sexual assault policy and prevention, and military outreach to American
society. The first two topics are representative of some of the major
military news stories in the media at the time, and the third is a topic
that should not be taken lightly. While the first two conclusions inform
the issue, the recommendation truly reinforces an emerging rift in US
civil-military relations that the military is responsible for closing.

Civil-Military Relations

Alexis de Tocqueville once assessed Americans as having an
“irritable patriotism,” trapped somewhere between the “instinctive
patriotism” that comes from an affection for one’s birthplace and
from civic action in a republic. This irritable patriotism led Americans,
in Tocqueville’s eyes, to be both ardently defensive and reverently
questioning of the country in which they lived and the institutions
they served. He concluded a more enduring form of patriotism results
when citizens gain knowledge of and engage with their government,
something he saw in Americans at even the lowest classes.2
Americans are undoubtedly proud of their nation’s military. In fact,
91 percent of participants in a 2011 survey “felt proud of the soldiers

MAJ Thomas N. “Nate”
Garner, an armor officer,
currently serves as a
strategic planner for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. He
has a masters of public
policy from Georgetown
University, was a
University of North
Carolina Institute for
Defense and Business
1      This commentary is based on Thomas N. Garner, “The Military as a Mirror: Should the Strategic Studies fellow,
Military Be Representative of American Society?,” in Confronting Inequality: Wealth, Rights, and Power, and taught American
ed. Hugh Liebert, Thomas Sherlock, and Cole Pinheiro (Hudson NY: Sloan, 2016).
Politics, Policy, and
2      Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America: An Annotated Text Backgrounds Interpretations, ed. Strategy at the United
States Military Academy.
Isaac Kramnick (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 197–99.
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who have served in the military in the post 9/11 era.” 3 But this pride may
not resemble what Tocqueville called instinctive patriotism, patriotism
based on civic action, or reflective patriotism. There is reason to worry
that Americans are proud of their military not because of involvement
with it or reflection about what makes it good, but simply because
it is theirs.
The past decade has elicited a patriotism that more closely reflects
Tocqueville’s ideation of instinctive patriotism, meaning a stable society
is based on institutions passed down from previous generations, and
often left unquestioned.4 In this fashion, the instinctive, or reflexive,
patriotism of the past decade-plus has led to an emerging rift in US
civil-military relations that is the military’s responsibility to close.5
Truthfully, this rift is not a matter of policy, and yet, it is almost entirely
the military’s fault.
Before Samuel Huntington wrote The Soldier and the State, the majority
of civil-military thought had centered on the fear of a military coup d’etat.6
Authoritative writers such as Tocqueville and Montesquieu informed
and fortified America’s founders to take caution in their constitutional
structures against the ills of a standing army. Huntington, on the other
hand, informed the current civil-military debate by defining the “role of
the military in society . . . in terms of ‘civilian control.’ ” 7
Scholars such as Peter D. Feaver have explored the relationship
between military and civilian institutions as a principal-agent problem:
a relationship in which one side (the civilian) attempts to get another
(the military) to carry out its will, while making use of the military’s
own expert knowledge.8 Morris Janowitz, like Feaver, views the military
as an instrument of national security policy. For Janowitz, the military’s
relationship to the civilian government resembles that of a pressure group
that “is not a voluntary association, acting on the organs of government;
on the contrary, it is an organ of government, seeking to develop new
techniques for intervening in domestic politics.” 9
But a more recent rift assumes a different character. Since 2011,
many articles and polls have shown that American society (71 percent
of the public) and the US military (84 percent of veterans) are coming
no closer to developing a shared understanding of each other or the

3      Bruce Drake, “On Memorial Day, Public Pride in Veterans, But at a Distance,” Pew Research
Center, May 24, 2013.
4      Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 196.
5      James Fallows, “The Tragedy of the American Military,” Atlantic, January/February 2015.
6      Richard H. Kohn, “Building Trust: Civil-Military Behaviors for Effective National Security,”
in American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era, eds. Suzanne C. Nielsen and
Don. M. Snider (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 264–89.
7     Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 80.
8      Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question
of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 170.
9      Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press,
1971), 369.
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military’s problems.10 The current rift does not ignore the relationship
and the challenges associated with Huntington’s definition of civilian
control, rather the rift is an extension of this civil-military relationship
to the society that the military serves.

Military Responsibility

By accepting the overwhelming trust and legitimacy bestowed on
it without adequate self-criticism, the military has abdicated its voice
in the national dialogue. In large part, the silence, associated with a
professional ethos of humility, which is prevalent in large portions of the
service, widens the rift between servicemembers and the civilians they
serve, which has allowed the rift to exist in the first place. The problem
is not trust, the military’s pride in itself, or civilian’s pride in the military.
The problem is that civilian trust in the military institution is becoming
meaningless because of the public’s lack of understanding of the military and the military’s acceptance of that trust as confirmation of its
efforts. Therefore, the onus is on the military to be far more critical of
itself than the public.
The danger, however, is that transparency may reveal “all the dark
secrets” to the public, sacrificing a bit of civilian trust. But it would also
give the military an opportunity to justify, or self-actualize, the trust by
adequately earning it instead of merely receiving it. Unlike Tocqueville’s
fear of democratic armies, where officers separate themselves from the
society, it can be assumed the soldiers of today want to return to society
after service in much the same fashion expressed by George Washington
in 1775: “When we assumed the soldier, we did not [lay aside the] citizen,
and we shall most sincerely rejoice . . . to return to our private stations.” 11
The real hope is the society and the soldier are not so unfamiliar to one
another that there is no longer any meaningful connection.
This particular civil-military rift is the military’s to close because
of the concept of the military profession’s responsibility to society
enumerated by Huntington.12 As Richard Kohn states, the “profession
is intrinsically values-based, creating the necessary bond of trust
between the professional and the nation served.” 13 Huntington suggests
this bond arises not from the military’s representation of society but
from the nature of the profession itself. Professions are trusted when
they demonstrate expertise and responsibility. But “ultimately it is the
military that must make the relationship work.” 14
To make that relationship work and create the necessary bond
of trust, the military should connect with the American public by
10      “War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era: Executive Summary,” Pew Research Center,
October 5, 2011; Mark Thompson, “An Army Apart: The Widening Military-Civilian Gap,” Time,
November 10, 2011; and Drake, “On Memorial Day.”
11      George Washington, “Address to the New York Provincial Congress” (speech, New York,
June 26, 1775).
12      Huntington, Soldier and the State, 8–10.
13      Suzanne Nielsen, “The Army Officer as Servant and Professional,” in The Future of the Army
Profession, eds. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005), 168.
14      Kohn, “Building Trust,” 287.
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conducting outreach, discussing shared values, and engaging in public
discussions. Actions as simple as moving into and becoming involved
with the community or thinking, discussing, and writing critically about
successes and issues associated with service could be what bridges the
gap. The majority of service members can work alongside public affairs
officers who develop coherent strategic messaging anyone in the service
can use to educate the public about efforts that might include such topics
as gender integration or day-to-day activities at the small unit level.

Civilian Blame

The professional ethos of humility prevalent in large portions of
the service prevents the military from closing the gap. Kohn instead
blames careerism, or “the pressure to conform, to stay silent, to go
along, or to do what advances one’s career.” 15 Whether the motivation
is conceptualized as humble altruism or selfish ambition, the problem
remains the same; the majority of the professional force cannot remain
silent. To do so would be an abdication of one’s responsibility to educate
and to inform the society that he or she serves. Authors such as David
Barno and Nora Bensahel place the blame on “civilians [who] have a
responsibility to understand their military and have an essential role in
decisions to commit it to battle—regardless of how removed they may
be from personal participation or connection to our warriors.” 16
While this is certainly applicable to civilian political leadership of
America’s military, the assessment is unfair for the civilian population
at large. After all, the military has moved far from the original
democratic warnings and separated itself from society on limitedaccess installations complete with walls, guards, retail stores, schools,
and churches. Barno and Bensahel go on to condemn the society at large:
“Wearing yellow ribbons and saying ‘thank you for your service’ are
simply no substitute for active engagement with U.S. military personnel
and the political decisions to send them into harms way.” 17
The perspective of civilian responsibility for the rift is hard to shake.
Michael J. Sandel reinforces, “military service, like jury duty, is a civic
responsibility” that expresses and deepens democratic citizenship. He
argues that “turning military service into a commodity—a task we
hire people to perform—corrupts the civic ideals that should govern
it. . . . It allows us to abdicate a civic duty.” 18 He further contends choice
in legitimacy for a military rests in the idea of civic responsibility that
is closer to Kohn’s careerism or to Janowitz’s military pressure group
than to an ethos of humility. The gap may well be a failure in civic
responsibility on the part of the citizen. But that possibility does not
relinquish or excuse the military from responsibility.
15      Kohn, “Building Trust,” 277.
16      David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “When the Yellow Ribbons Fade: Reconnecting Our
Soldiers and Citizens,” War on the Rocks, July 14, 2015.
17      Barno and Bensahel, “When the Yellow Ribbons Fade.”
18      Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing To Do? (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2009), 86.
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Modern concepts of military professionalism—whether they be from
Huntington, Feaver, Nielsen, or even Kohn—maintain the military must
ultimately make the civilian relationship work “just as doctors do with
their patients, lawyers with their clients, teachers with their students, and
all professionals with those they serve.” 19 The military owes society what
it wants—military outreach. By passing up opportunities to educate the
civilian population on its current challenges and successes, the military
abdicates its voice and its responsibility.

19      Kohn, “Building Trust,” 287.
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Social Media Warriors:
Leveraging a New Battlespace
Buddhika B. Jayamaha and Jahara Matisek
©2019 Buddhika B. Jayamaha

ABSTRACT: This article explains modern efforts to create a
new battlespace within the civil societies of Western countries.
This battlespace consists of the internet, social media, and other
technologies that can be used to foment social and political
discontent. The article includes recommendations for countering
such efforts.

C

ivil society presents a fundamental blind spot in the
American military understanding of warfare. Long associated
by philosophers as a bulwark against tyranny in liberal
democracies, civil society has been weaponized by hostile actors, such
as Russia and China, and violent nonstate actors, such as the Islamic
State. The adversaries’ strategy involves infiltrating Western civil
society in order to foment dissent and create breaches along ethnic,
racial, religious, and socioeconomic lines. These actions generate and
intensify hyperpartisanship on both sides of the political spectrum for
the purposes of deepening societal divisions. Such new tactics differ
from their historical antecedents in which hostile adversaries (Cold War
Communist states) supported one side of Western civil society (left-wing
political movements) in hopes of shifting political attitudes.
The new tactics create ideologically sympathetic individuals who
desire policy changes that align with the adversarial state’s ideology or
that promote detrimental and self-destructive views; these views, in
turn, can undermine societal cohesion while disrupting foreign policy
choices. This approach accentuates attacks on Western civil society
across multiple dimensions by using social media warriors who indirectly
receive orders from, and are secretly paid by, Moscow, Beijing, and other
Western adversaries. These social media warriors and their handlers
regard the internet as an unguarded, undersurveilled, and ill-defined
human-to-human interface that can be easily manipulated. Subsequently,
social media forums such as Facebook and Twitter become a battlespace
of ideas, injected with disinformation in hopes of influencing individual,
societal, and political behavior.1
As a consequence, the discourse of Western civil society is shaped
in ways fundamentally hostile to the effective functioning of pluralist

1      Ashley Hoffman, “Here Are the Memes That Russian Operatives Shared To Influence
2016,” Time, November 1, 2017; and Timothy P. McGeehan, “Countering Russian Disinformation,”
Parameters 48, no.1 (Spring 2018): 49–57.
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liberal democracies.2 Fomenting dissension by spreading divisive social
media posts and polarizing memes leads citizens in Western societies to
like, and to share, the messages as well as to advocate for the ideas, thus
creating a destructive civil discourse. In a homogenous society, such
as Iceland, this type of campaign has less impact because the societal
differences are primarily economic. But in countries with a variety
of cultural and historical cleavages, malicious civil discourse deepens
existing divisions that make social relations more acrimonious.
Disinformation tactics against civil societies in the United States
and its Western allies are not particularly new.3 The novelty, however,
is the use of free and open civil discourse, which is traditionally a
Western strength, as the center of sociocultural strategy aimed at
manipulating civil society into a new battlespace. The first component
of this strategy relies on the existence of the internet and the use of
social media. With the internet as the medium, individuals conduct
essential societal interactions through a variety of apps and platforms
that provide instantaneous, uberefficient, daily social contacts without
the boundaries that affected civil interaction during the twentieth
century. Anti-Western actors use these virtual networks to produce and
to breed ideas degenerative to stable societal norms, which ultimately
impact policy debates and elections.4
The second component of this strategy involves the exploitation of
the rules that govern pluralist-liberal democracies. When an adversarial
state recruits an informer, it is an act of espionage. But a private group
providing material, ideational, rhetorical, and inspirational support to
a community, industry lobbying, or religious group is squarely within
the protected legacy of free speech. In this manner, adversaries search
for and capitalize on the weaknesses available to them. Many virulent
Salafi-Jihadists preach Western destruction in Western capitals and large
cosmopolitan cities where their dialogue is legally protected. But such
liberty is nonexistent in their tyrannical home regimes.
The cumulative impact of this dual strategy not only degrades
institutions, norms, and values but also increases distrust toward the
government, undermining Western policy-making capacity and state
power. With statistics indicating public trust in the American government is near an all-time low and trending downward, the adversarial
strategy of further breaching civil society and democratic processes
seems to be effective.5 In fact, a poll commissioned by former President
George W. Bush and former Vice President Joe Biden found 55 percent
2      Douglas A. Ollivant, “The Rise of the Hybrid Warriors: From Ukraine to the Middle East,”
War on the Rocks, March 9, 2016; and Jahara W. Matisek, “The Blockchain Arms Race: America vs.
China,” National Interest, March 14, 2018. The Iranians, Turks, Syrians, and many other governments
are relying on hybrid warriors to influence the Middle East and beyond.
3      Tyler Quinn, “The Bear’s Side of the Story: Russian Political and Information Warfare,”
Strategy Bridge, June 27, 2018; and Emilio J. Iasiello, “Russia’s Improved Information Operations:
From Georgia to Crimea,” Parameters 47, no. 2 (Summer 2017): 51–63.
4      Hoffman, “Here Are the Memes.”
5      “Public Trust in Government: 1958–2017,” Pew Research Center, December 14, 2017.
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of respondents thought democracy was “weak and 68 percent believe[d]
it is getting weaker.” 6
The process of creating societal rifts to expand existing divisions,
and to generate self-destructive behaviors was called schismogenesis in
1935.7 The Office of Strategic Services, an institutional precursor to
the Central Intelligence Agency, used this theory in the South Pacific
during World War II to sow disunity among enemy fighters and to
create schisms in communities supportive of Japanese rule.8 Likewise,
the recent rise of extremist politics in the United States and in western
Europe provides growing evidence that schismogenesis appears to have
been fueled by Russia, China, and numerous other hostile actors who
can benefit from the cost-effective method of weakening the rules-based
international order without directly confronting the West.9
The internet, formed by multiple layers of human-to-human
and machine-to-machine interfaces that are neither malevolent nor
benevolent, was intended to be self-governing. The permissible legal
architecture guarantees individual and community freedoms, especially
in liberal democracies that are easily exploitable by hybrid actors who face
few mechanisms of enforcement. Moreover, the ubiquity of connected
devices and Western dependency on them makes it easier for adversarial
powers to penetrate systems and create social media chaos.
The value of freedom to liberal societies further complicates efforts
to detect hostile attempts to create schismogenesis because recognizing
the activity requires substantial domestic surveillance. Three years into
the conflict in the Donbass, for example, scholars in the Ukraine finally
began to document the various ways in which Russia had achieved
schismogenesis.10 Thus, the decision to let the internet be self-governed
has inadvertently meant agencies that are supposed to protect the
citizenry are unable to, save for exceptional circumstances. Moreover,
the conceptual and analytical void created by these protections prevents
operational countermeasures.
Exacerbating this challenge is the informational asymmetry between
countries, which enables hybrid actors to exploit their knowledge of
what America and Europe are in the context of the strengths and the
weaknesses of their own countries. Because the average Western citizen
6      James Hohmann, “The Daily 202: A Poll Commissioned by Bush and Biden Shows Americans
Losing Confidence in Democracy,” Washington Post, June 26, 2018.
7      Gregory Bateson, “Culture Contact and Schismogenesis,” Man 35 (December 1935): 178–83;
and David Lipset, Gregory Bateson: The Legacy of a Scientist (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1980), 143–44.
8      David H. Price, “Gregory Bateson and the OSS: World War II and Bateson’s Assessment of
Applied Anthropology,” Human Organization 57, no. 4 (Winter 1998): 379–84; and David H. Price,
Anthropological Intelligence: The Deployment and Neglect of American Anthropology in the Second World War
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 239–42.
9      William M. Downs, “Democracy’s New Normal: The Impact of Extremist Parties,” World
Politics Review, January 22, 2013; William Hague, “Western Voters Are Very Angry—and Extremists
Are One Crisis Away from Power,” Telegraph, January 26, 2016; and Mike Lofgren, “Trump, Putin,
and the Alt-Right International,” Atlantic, October 31, 2016.
10      Roman Dodonov et al., “Polemological Paradigm of Hybrid War Research,” Philosophy and
Cosmology 19 (2017): 97–109.
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has little knowledge of these factors, external adversaries can hire
inexpensive part-time social media experts to insert polarizing rhetoric
into ongoing political, societal, and cultural debates inside the West.
Current conceptions of this kind of warfare typically focus on how
hostile actors best combine kinetic and nonkinetic tactics to degrade US
power and influence in various regions.11 General Philip M. Breedlove
recently expressed concern for the false narrative affecting the West.12
This is a step in the right direction, but it does not take into account
the depth and severity of schismogenesis created with the intent of
dismantling Western civil society. This oversight is because the West’s
adversaries rely on a strategy of socially embedding hostility into the
political discourse, converting civil society from a constructive force
into a destructive one.
Civil society is the total of nonstate organizations that represent
the collective interests of its members by checking state power, upholding public interest, and shaping public discourse.13 In one form,
political parties maintain the republican tradition and pluralistic
form of interest representation in the United States.14 Other such
organizations include industry lobbyists; civil rights organizations;
ethnic-, racial-, and religious-specific organizations; and environmental
activist groups. Registered lobbyists, which can advance the interests of
foreign governments, can range from the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee to lesser-known groups that work on behalf of actors such
as India, Armenia, and Kurdistan.15 Other domestic lobbying groups
promote national issues such as racial equality or prison reform and some
represent local organizations such as a neighborhood humane society.
Civil society is vital for holding diverse populations together and
is a defining strength of Western liberal democracies. Liberal, in the
sense of John Locke, means a system that highlights and safeguards
individual freedoms.16 In such a system, citizens have the right to form
nonviolent contractual organizations that sustain economic and political
competition as well as a vibrant civil society.17 These alliances provide an
outlet for political discourse from motivated individuals who pursue their
interests in finding moderate policies and agreements without resorting
11      John J. Kruzel, “ ‘Hybrid War’ To Pull US Military in Two Directions, Flournoy Says,”
Department of Defense, May 4, 2009.
12      Jim Garamone, “NATO Commander Breedlove Discusses Implications of Hybrid War,”
Department of Defense, March 23, 2015.
13      Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1977).
14      Theda Skocpol, “Civil Society in the United States,” in The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society,
ed. Michael Edwards (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 109–21.
15      John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008); Ashok Sharma, “Behind Modi: The Growing Influence of the
India Lobby,” Conversation, June 27, 2017; Ömer Taşpınar, “The Armenian Lobby and Azerbaijan:
Strange Bedfellows in Washington,” Brookings, March 8, 2010; and Eric Lipton, “Iraqi Kurds Build
Washington Lobbying Machine to Fund War Against ISIS,” New York Times, May 6, 2016.
16      John Locke, Political Writings, ed. David Wootton (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993).
17      Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, “Violence and the Rise of
Open-Access Orders,” Journal of Democracy 20, no. 1 (January 2009): 55–68.
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to destructive behaviors such as violence. In this manner, negative and
positive freedoms are balanced, rights are not trampled on by either side
of the political spectrum, and the two remain in constant contention.18
Communal organizations that constitute civil society are a
necessary foundation for liberty and resisting the tyrannical tendencies
of unchecked executive power.19 Some organizations are goal driven,
and as a consequence, can be utterly uncivil, profoundly illiberal, and
easily manipulated if the organizational objectives align with those of
a patron or patrons. Before the Nazi party took control of Germany in
the early 1930s, the country was dense with civil society organizations
and had more Nobel Prize winners than any other country in the
world.20 Unfortunately, many civil society organizations, to include the
Nazi movement, happened to be explicitly Fascist, or contained Fascist
sympathizers, despite Germany being highly sophisticated and educated.
The strength of American democracy similarly promotes the same
rights for all groups whether they are white supremacist groups in
Charlottesville, Virginia, or Black Lives Matter marches in Houston,
Texas. This equality allows true freedom of thought and expression,
which makes America diverse and interesting—and creates a
vulnerability. Ideas contrary to the opinions of Western authorities do
not lead to harassment and oppression. And Western laws, traditions,
and norms prevent governments from investigating the actions of civil
society organizations without reasonable cause. Hybrid actors, therefore,
work around the edges of this system to find its weaknesses and achieve
their goals. Consequently, civil society becomes a battlespace as social
media actors pose as insiders to create and to foment societal schisms.
The same concept applies when external actors deliberately use
aspects of the liberal order, integrated markets, and lax immigration
rules for elites and professionals. Each individual has the potential to
undermine the strengths of each aspect of civil society from within,
sometimes with the complicity of individuals, sometimes via inadvertent
foreign threats, and sometimes through soft power influence such as
China’s educational exchanges through the Confucius Institute.21
Another fundamental distinction in a liberal democracy is that every
citizen has the same rights: each has the opportunity to reach the highest
ranks in public and private life. The late General John Shalikashvili, for
example, was a refugee during World War II who immigrated to the
18      Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 162–66.
19      Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,”
European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie 25, no.
2 (1984): 185–213.
20      Ulrich Herbert, “Berlin: The Persecution of Jews and German Society,” in Civil Society and
the Holocaust: International Perspectives on Resistance and Rescue, ed. Anders Jerichow and Cecilie Felicia
Stokholm Banke (New York: Humanity in Action, 2013), 75–83; Sheri Berman, “Civil Society and
the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” World Politics 49, no. 3 (April 1997): 401–29; Michael Mann,
Fascists (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 162–205; and “All Nobel Prizes,” Nobel
Prize, accessed March 6, 2019, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/lists/all-nobel-prizes/.
21      Falk Hartig, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China,” Journal of Chinese Political Science
17, no. 1 (March 2012): 53–76.
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United States at age 16 and learned English by watching westerns. He
became the first foreign-born chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 22
This uniquely American moment was possible only because of the
country’s liberal democratic tradition. In contrast, an American citizen
immigrating to many other countries might struggle to get a lowly job,
let alone be allowed to achieve the highest military rank. Nefarious
governments, state affiliated proxies, and nonstate actors can, and do,
exploit this defining liberal principle.
In one such exploitation of Western politics, oligarchs affiliated
with the Chinese government bankrolled the winning campaign of a
naturalized Australian citizen during a parliamentary election, which
essentially made the politician a stooge of the Chinese government.23
In New Zealand, a naturalized Chinese citizen who had been a highranking military member in a Chinese intelligence agency is an elected
member of parliament; his wife, who is also a naturalized citizen, runs a
civil society organization that explicitly advocates for positions favorable
to the Chinese Communist Party.24 Evidence likewise suggests Beijing
has successfully penetrated both political parties in New Zealand, which
has led allies in the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance to question
if China’s influence should affect New Zealand’s membership in the
organization.25 Liberal regimes, however, have difficulty categorizing
such activities as illicit or licit.
Social media actors also use sharp-power tactics to force subjects to
be complicit.26 There are recorded instances of China using such tactics
to silence critics and to shape debates using state-sponsored groups
registered in liberal democracies, such as New Zealand and Australia.27
And although security agencies in liberal democracies with immigrant
traditions neither hold citizens as hostages for bargaining purposes or
use the familial relationships of naturalized citizens to compel them to be
complicit in treasonous acts, evidence suggests Iran, Turkey, Russia, and
China are leveraging transnational family relationships in this manner.
Displaced populations provide another opportunity for Western
adversaries, such as Iran and China, to influence other countries.28

22      Shaila Dewan, “Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Military Chief in 1990s, Dies at 75,” New York
Times, July 23, 2011.
23      Philip Wen, “China’s Patriots among Us: Beijing Pulls New Lever of Influence in Australia,”
Sydney Morning Herald, April 14, 2016.
24      Jamil Anderlini, “China-Born New Zealand MP Probed by Spy Agency,” Financial Times,
September 13, 2017.
25      David Fisher, “Chinese Communist Party Link Claimed,” Otago (Dunedin, New Zealand)
Daily Times, May 26, 2018; and Eleanor Ainge Roy, “New Zealand’s Five Eyes Membership Called
into Question over ‘China Links,’ ” Guardian, May 27, 2018.
26      “How China’s ‘Sharp Power’ Is Muting Criticism Abroad,” Economist, December 14, 2017.
27      Elif Selin Calik, “A Newly Coined Phrase: ‘Sharp Power’ and Reasons for Attributing It to
China,” Rising Powers Project, January 6, 2018.
28      Timothy Heath, “Beijing’s Influence Operations Target Chinese Diaspora,” War on the
Rocks, March 1, 2018; and Linda Robinson et al., Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible
Responses (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018).
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Turkey exploits the Turkish diaspora in France and Germany.29 Russia
sends explicit threats and conducts highly public murders.30 These
realities are further complicated by the democracies’ desires to protect
equality, which causes them to view the mere suggestion of such issues
being a security concern as a sign of xenophobia.
A larger target exists in the integration of markets and the
manipulation or capture of big data from transnational corporations. By
law and tradition, liberal democracies have stringent privacy standards
directing how much data governments can access; illiberal regimes do
not. Therefore, many corporations maintain double standards in their
privacy efforts. The US government, for example, has to go through
numerous legal procedures and provisions to access a criminal’s iPhone.
But Apple provides backdoor keys to the Chinese government and hosts
iCloud services on Chinese government-run servers, in effect collecting
and collating data on behalf of the Chinese state.31 Due to market
incentives, Apple actively collaborates to support state surveillance with
China and widely purports to guard data privacy in the West.
The value of this effort becomes clear in the context of an average
citizen generating more than a terabyte of data in a day. Western
governments, by law, have almost no access to this information even
though private companies can freely access, collect, collate, use, and sell
the data. Cambridge Analytica became the posterchild of this emerging
problem when it used data mining to help political candidates.32 Moreover,
nothing prevents business proxies of foreign states—including the stateowned enterprises of Russia, China, and Iran—from accessing them.
One can imagine a nightmare scenario in which Chinese intelligence
officials aggregate data purchased from a social media outlet with the
data hacked from the Office of Personnel Management (2014–15).33 An
individual posing as a real estate agent, could use this information and
financial data legally purchased from a credit bureau to create a nearcomplete profile of any individual that the Chinese government may
want to target. Such an effort could possibly compromise anyone in the
United States who has a security clearance. But the security implications
have rarely been discussed because Western capitalism rarely results
in patriotic fervor towards one’s home country, which is becoming
increasingly problematic in the rising era of the “Davos Man” and the
pursuit of a home with the lowest tax burden.34
29      Zeynep Sahin Mencutek and Bahar Baser, “Mobilizing Diasporas: Insights from Turkey’s
Attempts To Reach Turkish Citizens Abroad,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 20, no. 1
(September 2017): 86–105.
30      Lucy Pasha-Robinson, “The Long History of Russian Deaths in the UK under Mysterious
Circumstances,” Independent, March 6, 2018.
31      Sherisse Pham, “Use iCloud in China? Prepare to Share Your Data with a State-run Firm,”
CNN News, January 11, 2018.
32      Scott Neuman, “In Hidden-Camera Exposé, Cambridge Analytica Executives Boast of Role
in Trump Win,” NPR, March 21, 2018.
33      Brendan I. Koerner, “Inside the Cyberattack that Shocked the US Government,” Wired,
October 23, 2016.
34      Samuel P. Huntington, “Dead Souls: The Denationalization of the American Elite,” National
Interest 75 (Spring 2004): 5–18.
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Social media manipulators also directly infiltrate public debates,
interfere with political consensus, and support domestic civic society
organizations, political parties, and individual candidates. With loose
election finance laws that recognize individuals and corporations
equally, nothing prevents foreign corporations with proxy firms from
creating super political action committees to influence elections. The
rise of cryptocurrencies makes this process even easier. Again, American
defense and security agencies are not allowed to look into the affiliations
of these actors without reason due to privacy laws fiercely guarding
against such efforts. Such opportunities in Western civil society make
perpetrating schismogenesis easier.
Other technologies also play a fundamental role in new forms of
hybrid attacks against the West. Troll farms contribute to hyperpolarized
debates, further developing schismogenesis.35 Many citizens with access
to social media are subconsciously led to choose one side of a purely
manufactured debate. Interest is often generated and sustained by the
spread of memes that play to each side of a divisive debate in a civil
society, which makes identifying hostile attempts to undermine civil
society even more urgent for the United States and its allies.
Adversarial states rely on their social media actors to pose as citizens
in other states to deepen and to polarize divisions and cleavages, as
well as to turn policy debates into threats to groups on both sides of an
issue. These actors create seemingly genuine domestic movements such
as fake veteran groups that appear American but pursue conspiratorial
grievances in hopes of gaining citizen-advocates for the movement.36
The hope is that the artificially implanted movement will take on a life
of its own as more such actors encourage duped citizens to fight for both
sides of the fabricated causes.
The problem with these movements is that they encourage
debates about governance while making active calls for violence.
Little investigation has considered how much antigovernment activity
is homegrown and how much is exploitation by foreign actors with
knowledge of divisive issues, which remains within the theoretical
framework of schismogenesis. Although identifying true intellectual
debates between citizens and fabricated divisive discussions among
hybrid actors is quite difficult, evidence does suggest a Russian troll farm
pushed for “Brexit,” hacked the 2017 French presidential election, and
meddled in the 2016 American presidential election.37 The US military,
due to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, however, cannot respond to
such hybrid attacks on civil society. National intelligence agencies and
federal law enforcement must deal with these problems.
35      Dave Lee, “The Tactics of a Russian Troll Farm,” BBC News, February 16, 2018.
36      Craig Timberg, “Russian Operatives Used Twitter and Facebook to Target Veterans and
Military Personnel, Study Says,” Washington Post, October 9, 2017.
37      Robert Booth et al., “Russia Used Hundreds of Fake Accounts To Tweet about Brexit, Data
Shows,” Guardian, November 14, 2017; Laura Daniels, “How Russia Hacked the French Election,”
Politico, April 23, 2017; and Dan Mangan and Mike Calia, “Special Counsel Mueller: Russians
Conducted ‘Information Warfare’ against US during Election To Help Donald Trump Win,” CNBC,
February 16, 2018.
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As Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster said, “There are two ways to
fight the United States military: asymmetrically and stupid.” 38 The stupid
way was how Saddam Hussein engaged in conventional battles with the
US military and its coalition allies in 1991 and 2003. The asymmetric way
is combating US influence and American military power with indirect
efforts. China’s and Russia’s sociocultural attacks on American society
are an asymmetric, nonkinetic method of perpetrating a political and an
informational war within the United States. Such warfare is difficult for
political and military leaders to respond to adequately, which has dark
implications for how democracies are supposed to work.
In a cruel twist of fate, the same Western culture and civil society
institutions that made America and the West culturally stronger than the
Soviet Union have been exploited by the losing side of the Cold War. It
is almost as if Western leaders never thought the features that enabled
the triumphant defeat of Communism could ever be used to fragment
the United States and its allies. Because Western leaders typically
think of warfare in terms of the Clausewitizian trinity—government,
people, and the military—civil society is often overlooked as a target.39
What Clausewitz did not address in his early nineteenth century writings
was that civil society is the sinew binding the citizenry, military, and
government to one another. Attacking this “glue” appears to be more
successful than targeting each part of the trinity directly.

Strategic Scope

The West has several suspicions regarding Chinese and Russian
motivations for relying on this type of warfare to create schismogenesis
and to weaken the American-led world order. Such infiltration and
disruption of Western civil society undermines democratic institutions,
thereby complicating the policy-making process. More importantly, it
is an asymmetric strategy that weakens Western power and strength
without substantial financial investments in conventional armaments.
And finally, there is little risk of igniting a conventional military
engagement with a more powerful opponent.
By injecting polarity, divisiveness, and fragmentation into freespeech debates, hybrid actors can sow political confusion in Western
states to give authoritarian regimes more breathing space, both domestically and internationally. Besides using social media trolls and bots
to encourage division, Russian-backed media and news platforms present
counternarratives and conspiratorial ideas in the West.40 During the
Cold War, the United States actively defended against such political and
information warfare with the US Information Agency.41 Today, however,

38      LTG H. R. McMaster, quoted in Jeff Schogol, “ ‘American War Generals’ a Sobering
Reflection on US Failures in Iraq,” Military Times, September 11, 2014.
39      Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 32, 89.
40      T. S. Allen and A. J. Moore, “Victory without Casualties: Russia’s Information Operations,”
Parameters 48, no. 1 (Spring 2018): 59–71.
41      Nicholas J. Cull, The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency: American Public
Diplomacy, 1989–2001 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
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adversarial methods are subversive, the amount of threat activity is
overwhelming, and US government agencies are hard-pressed to keep
up with, counter, deter, or defeat adversaries in the information domain.
Civil societies in Australia and New Zealand also appear to be
under assault from the Chinese government. A scholar who identified
how the Chinese were buying political parties and public intellectuals
in Australia and New Zealand began to be intimidated by Chinese
agents when she exposed these actions in her published writings.42 This
documented attempt by an adversarial government to usurp civil society
has major implications for the West since it shows China could easily use
transnational connections to pursue similar actions in the United States
and Europe.
Growing evidence also indicates Russian support of various civil
society groups in the United States such as an antifracking group and the
National Rifle Association (NRA).43 Such actions by Russia seemingly to
protect the environment and support constitutional gun rights are not
virtuous. Instead, supporting the antifracking group protects Russia’s
economic interests and supporting the NRA allows Russia and other
authoritarian governments to paint American democracy as a dangerous
experiment that should not be emulated.44
Similar actions by foreign entities to support other civil society
groups indicate American politics are being subverted to foment longterm instability. If one accepts the idea that such groups are designed
to uphold the rights of citizens, then one should also assume America’s
adversaries understand that idea too. China and Russia likely find it in
their national interests to fund and to support controversial civil society
groups for the purpose of exacerbating societal tension and violence,
which fits the model of schismogenesis.45 This practice has been best
exemplified by Russian troll farms creating seemingly homegrown
movements that center on unarmed black men being shot by police
and include one sham group cheering police actions and another
protesting them.46
Cryptocurrency and artificial intelligence technologies also provide
tools for schismogenesis. With the advent of Bitcoin and similar
cryptocurrencies, covertly funding various civil society groups becomes
much easier for adversaries to do and more difficult for Western security

42      Matt Nippert, “University of Canterbury Professor Anne-Marie Brady Concerned Break-Ins
Linked to Work on China,” NZ Herald, February 16, 2018.
43      Merill Matthews, “Democrats Dig for Russian Connection and Uncover Environmentalists,”
The Hill, October 26, 2017; and Tim Dickinson, “Inside the Decade-Long Russian Campaign to
Infiltrate the NRA and Help Elect Trump,” Rolling Stone, April 2, 2018.
44      Isaac Stone Fish, “How Chinese Media Covers U.S. Gun Violence,” USA Today, February
17, 2018; and Erin Griffith, “Pro-Gun Russian Bots Flood Twitter after Parkland Shooting,” Wired,
February 15, 2018.
45      Philip Ewing, “Russians Targeted U.S. Racial Divisions Long Before 2016 and Black Lives
Matter,” NPR, October 30, 2017.
46      Donie O’Sullivan, “Her Son Was Killed—Then Came the Russian Trolls,” CNN News, June
29, 2018.
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agencies to detect.47 The development of artificial intelligence will only
make employing social media easier because bots can maintain hundreds
of social media accounts to interact with citizens in a humanlike
fashion, and potentially to recruit humans to support their false causes.
Furthermore, future developments of quantum computing will improve
the efficacy of such actions to a currently unthinkable level of precision.
Actively creating schisms to undermine societies is a relatively
effortless venture in heterogeneous societies with deep-rooted and
crosscut social cleavages. As a result, Russia, China, Iran, North Korea,
Islamic State, and other illiberal states will likely continue and even
escalate their efforts in hopes of tearing apart the civic fabric in the
United States and other Western nations. This strategy, which was used
to promote Texas’s secession and California’s independence, is meant to
undermine Western societies by making citizens feel that they have no
stake in the system and that their government is no longer working.48
With California initially allowing a radical measure to propose splitting
into three different states on the November 2018 ballot, there is little
doubt Russia and other anti-Western actors will support similar initiatives
to weaken American power.49

Strategic Implications

The United States and many of its Western allies lack the legal
framework and the institutional capabilities to deal adequately with this
challenge. Since most democracies have federal laws that forbid their
militaries from operating domestically, the new battlespace falls under
the responsibility of domestic law enforcement. Thus, the challenge
ahead is both conceptual and operational. The threat must first be
recognized and then countered. Regardless, an active defense and a
strategic offensive by Western governments are required to discredit
hybrid actors and to punish the regimes backing their attacks.50
The internet and the many web-based tools create a separate,
exploitable social dimension within the evolving human-to-human
interface. When external hybrid actors create schisms within this
network, security and law enforcement authorities must evaluate the
jurisdictional limitations of law enforcement, counterintelligence,
or counterespionage authorities. Regardless, any efforts to generate
public awareness of the hybrid activity will have to use the previously
exploited interfaces. Deep-rooted antigovernment sentiments in the
American public’s discourse present an additional challenge for the US
government’s responses. And so, the only way to prevent hybrid actors

47      Jahara Matisek, “Is China Weaponizing Blockchain Technology for Gray Zone Warfare?,”
Global Security Review, September 28, 2018.
48      David Martin Davies, “Examining How a Russian ‘Troll Factory’ Pushed Texas Secession,”
Texas Public Radio, October 23, 2017; and Will Yates, “ ‘Russian Trolls’ Promoted California
Independence,” BBC News, November 4, 2017.
49      Bob Egelko, “Splitting Up California: State Supreme Court Takes Initiative off Ballot,” San
Francisco Chronicle, July 18, 2018.
50      James P. Farwell, “Countering Russian Meddling in US Political Processes,” Parameters 48, no.
1 (Spring 2018): 37–47.
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from labeling any public awareness campaign as a covert psychological
operation conducted by the US government against its own citizens
is for the United States to maintain transparent efforts to encourage
civil society groups to behave with civility. Even then, success is
not guaranteed.
Security agencies can deter social media actors by using continual
vigilance and countermeasure efforts resembling those employed during
the Cold War. Western states can also create costs for hybrid activity by
engaging in retaliatory acts that likewise empower civil society actors
to antagonize the adversaries responsible for schismogenesis. This
strategy may be difficult, however, because of the risk associated with
crossing authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies that exercise
tight control over civil society. Regardless, Western values and traditions
are generally idealized by citizens in authoritarian countries, which leads
many refugees to seek asylum and educational opportunities in the West.
Western governments can consult Cold War era tactics, techniques, and
procedures to combat and to deter hybrid actors from attacking Western
civil society. These governments can also use emerging technologies
such as quantum computing to detect hybrid actors operating in Western
civil society under false pretenses.
If we transcend the optimism surrounding globalization and the
internet as benevolent forces and take account of the reality that they
will be increasingly exploited to undermine the West, then a proper
conceptualization of schismogenesis warrants the development of
deterrent capabilities. Western leaders do not critically engage in
debates about the attacks on civil society nor are deterrent capabilities
credibly mused beyond academic recommendations from the cyber
protection measures outlined in the Tallinn Manual that have yet to be
operationalized into robust security policies in the West.51 As a result,
illiberal regimes act with impunity. It is precisely because authoritarian
regimes fear their own internal weaknesses that they decry the appeal of
liberal democracies. Yet that appeal is the profound reason why refugees
flow toward the West and not toward Russia, China, or Iran, and it is
what compels these regimes to engage in the grand strategic game of
schismogenesis against the West.
Elites within the political and security establishments must
acknowledge and comprehend the nature and character of this threat
to civil society. This recognition will enable the preparation of the legal
frameworks needed to protect the new battlespace within Western civil
societies from being exploited by adversarial states and their proxies.
This effort will likely require an updated twenty-first century version
of the Posse Comitatus Act that enables the American military to
work domestically to protect civil society from hybrid actors pursuing
schismogenesis. Western governments must balance their efforts to

51      Michael N. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations,
2nd. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
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counter these external challenges with their protection of fundamental
liberal values and principles.
Such equity might be problematic for the nature and the strength
of the American republic, however, when the winner of the 2016
presidential election has reluctantly acknowledged, or outright rejected,
the likelihood of hostile social media activity influencing that election’s
campaigns.52 Moreover, the future of the United States could be bleak if it
continues denying the information presented by its intelligence agencies
or it remains reluctant to investigate and to punish those who aid and
abet hybrid actors. Without decisive action, American civil society will
likely continue to be fractured by social media warriors well beyond the
2020 election.
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ABSTRACT: This article argues American military strategists must
incorporate multidimensional power projection into their planning
processes to counter adversarial actions by gray-zone actors. By
developing a more complete concept of power projection, the
United States can apply its resources more effectively.

T

he United States faces coercive gradualism in the South China Sea,
nuclear provocation by a rogue state on the Korean peninsula,
and gray-zone aggression in the Ukraine and the Levant. In these
challenges, our adversaries purposefully occupy the space between war
and peace. They negate US military advantages by operating below the
threshold of armed conflict and through means designed to avoid, or
be immune to, combat power. America’s deterrence posture is likewise
becoming irrelevant because its adversaries operate successfully without
resorting to war.
At root, these diverse challenges target Pax Americana—the
networks of allies, systems of international diplomacy, commerce, and
law, as well as large swaths of territory and the resources they encompass.
Without a redesign of American global strategy, these networks and
resources could be lost. Accordingly, campaign planning must unify
power projection across all dimensions to press US advantages, defeat
adversaries, and maintain the desired strategic balance. In summary,
the United States must campaign against adversarial states and
nonstate actors, organizations, and individuals. The United States must
successfully operate in environments of intentional ambiguity, opacity,
and asymmetry, and do so without its most powerful weapons.
America’s rivals use various types of unrestricted warfare to achieve
a competitive, risk-adjusted advantage.1 To defeat these actors, the US
concept of power must expand to encompass an almost unlimited array
of dimensions of power such that the lines between hard and soft,
kinetic and nonkinetic will blur. The US concept of power projection
must expand from direct source-to-target frameworks and encompass
indirect and intermediated projection through networks and systems.
America must be able to orchestrate the interactions between its power
and its projection of that power on guidance, delivery, and effects by
employing spatial, nonspatial, hybrid, and complex projection means.

Mr. David J. Katz works
as a senior analyst at
US Special Operations
Command, J35
Transnational Threats
Division, Counter Threat
Finance. A West Point
graduate, he served
in the US Army as an
infantry officer and
Green Beret captain.
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and advisor before
founding his own
firm that provided
advanced analytics on
more than $3 billion
1      Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts of clients’ private
equity investments.
Publishing House, 1999).
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For these reasons, American analysts, planners, and practitioners
require a framework that enhances exploitable advantages over our
adversaries and that supports the design, development, and execution
of campaigns that capitalize on those advantages. This framework must
integrate power projection at its most granular: payloads combined
with projection vectors in specific dimensions, in a timely manner, to
form global campaigns of joint distributions of power across multiple
dimensions. This model must combine the arrays of power with the
mechanics of projection by vector, through networks, and across systems
while accounting for impediments like opacity, agency, and asymmetry.

Multidimensionality

We live in a multidimensional world. Typically, we campaign on land
and sea and in air and space. But information has become a new campaign front. It challenges us to think beyond geographically tethered
information to nonspatial information and from singular, granular data
to large scale, millennia-old nontangible systems like religion, finance,
and diplomacy as means for power projection. Multidimensionality
exists, in a nascent form, within current military planning as DIMEFIL
(diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and
law enforcement). A complete spectrum of power projection extends
DIMEFIL infinitely to include all dimensions offering all exploitable
advantages, whether structural or transient.
Power is applied to a target in order to bring about a desired
change in its state. Power projection is the process of delivering single
or multiple instances of power within a dimension. Multidimensional
power projection is this process extended across multiple dimensions
and described through four essential elements: class, source, payload,
and vector. Class defines the behavior of power against a target’s state.
Both a bullet driven by gunpowder and a bayonet driven by musclepower deliver kinetic energy to a target, thereby changing its state.
The behavior of the bullet and the bayonet against the target is
kinetic, and accordingly, their class is kinetic. In one case, the payload is a
bullet traveling along a ballistic path. In the other, a bayonet follows the
arc of human physiology. Both the bullet and the bayonet are payloads;
the path and the arc are projection vectors. A source is the initiator of an
instance of power projection—shooting a bullet, thrusting a bayonet.
A soldier, a policeman, and a criminal each possess and can initiate an
instance of kinetic power projection.

Projection Vectors

Projection vectors implement a class of behavior on a payload within
a specific dimension. The pistol’s barrel directs kinetic force (class)
applied to a bullet (payload) creating a ballistic path (vector) within a
kinetic dimension. An ambassador (source) hand-delivering (vector)
a demarche (payload) to a rival’s representative (target) is an instance
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of diplomatic power, formal communication by a sovereign entity in a
diplomatic dimension.
Projection vectors, like all vectors, have an angle and a length.
Direct bilateral projection, from source to target, is a zero-angle vector.
We tend to think of power projection as a single instance of a payload
traveling a vector from source to target, like a package delivered by
a courier or an artillery shell fired from a cannon. But force can be
applied on a payload by the target, pulled rather than pushed. If the
target has an affinity for something, perhaps bulk cash, and a payload is
designed to contain or display such characteristics, the target may pull,
move, or capture the payload by expending resources in the projection
dimension. Absent applied force, a payload remains static. A payload
in motion tends to remain in motion so long as the forces applied to it
exceed the friction of forces along its path.

Networks

In simple terms, networks are collections of entities and connections
(nodes and edges). Without networks, projection remains bilateral.
Networked power projection offers a multiplicity of paths to the target,
which may include indirect, nonspatial, and complex multidimensional
paths. Multiple paths in multiple dimensions require multiple vectors,
each operating within the dimension of the connection between
networked entities. Networked power projection delivers a number of
offensive advantages such as expanding the number of geometric paths
that make defense increasingly difficult. The use of friendly, neutral, and
hostile intermediating entities may mask power’s origin.
Networked multidimensional power can come from areas and in
forms outside of the antagonist’s expectation, awareness, or collection
capabilities. Projecting power through a network requires understanding
how payloads interact with intermediating entities, possibly requiring
semiautonomous or autonomous guidance for the payload. Networked
power projection also requires planning for the comparative velocities
of each payload. Multidimensional shock effect, where payloads from
multiple dimensions arrive on target at the same time amplifies results
and is a planning consideration.

Systems

Systems are subsets of networks. Manufactured systems, like
those of Pax Americana, are created and maintained because they
offer a positive net benefit, obtained through transformation, to their
participants. Systems—such as the global maritime commons—are not
necessarily bound by geographic or spatial limits. Systems—such as
transnational supply chains that manage factors like risk, demand, and
ownership—have a nonspatial aspect. Once created, these systems tend
toward stability as a means of preserving their benefits, and they react
against changes that pose a risk to their purpose and their transformative
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processes. Consequently, they can be harnessed through their tendency
to maintain their present state.
Systems contain the potential for several types of systemic failures:
cascades, contagions, and “black swans.” Cascading failures occur when
one fault within a system causes subsequent multiple failures. System
contagions occur when a system’s nodes, edges, and edge characteristics
are exploited to propagate effects antithetical to its purpose.
The Great Depression (1929–39) offers a contagion example. When
a local bank failed, all its debt, typically borrowings from other banks,
did not get repaid. The holders of that debt, regional banks, then failed
and their debts had to be written off. When regional banks failed,
their creditors, money-center banks, either failed or sold their debt and
ceased lending. The resulting credit contraction spurred more local
and regional bank failures. Generally, contagions spread an infection
through horizontal, peer-to-peer relationships, while cascade failures
occur in vertically integrated systems like supply chains.2 Black swans
are unpredictable outliers that are typically more than three standard
deviations out from a distribution’s mean: “Nothing in the past can
convincingly point to [their] possibility.” Yet these events, such as the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the Fukushima accident,
make “an extreme impact.” 3

Illustrating Multidimensionality in the Middle East

Multidimensional campaign planning can take place once the
analyst, planner, or practitioner develops an appreciation for the class,
source, payload, and vector of power projection, both inside and outside
networks and systems. With this understanding, the Israelis might
consider employing a persistent, multidimensional campaign against
the Iranian state to interdict, undermine, or collapse the missile and
rocket supply chains inside Iran instead of relying upon habitual airstrikes in Syria.
Likewise, Saudi Arabia could construct a financial cordon sanitaire
to constrain Iran’s use of external financial proxies such as the Omani
rial as well as to interdict bonds issued to develop the South Pars gas
field.4 Added to a range of physical, informational, financial, kinetic,
and electronic dimensional campaigns, Saudi Arabia and Israel jointly
may be able to contain Iranian actions while creating a series of selfamplifying cascade failures to roll back Iran’s foreign adventurism.

2      Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Blackouts and Cascading Failures of the Global Markets,” Scientific American,
January 1, 2009.
3      Nassim Nicholas Taleb, “The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable,” New York
Times, April 22, 2007.
4      Majority Report on the Review of U.S. Treasury Department’s License To Convert Iranian Assets Using the
U.S. Financial System by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Washington, DC: Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2018).

TOC

Coercion: New Means & Methods

Katz

29

Using Multidimensionality in the South China Sea

China’s dominance in the South and East China Seas appears to be
a “wicked problem” when viewed conventionally.5 China’s segmentation
of the South and East China Seas from the global maritime commons
included constructing in-depth missile and submarine coverage; using
the deniable actions of the maritime militia’s “little blue men” to harass,
ram, and sink civilian and sovereign ships; declaring an air defense
identification zone; and building militarized islands in the Spratly and
Paracel Islands.6
China established a corresponding legal basis for its strategy and
actions in 1992, 1996, and 1998 when it crafted legislation to assume
regulatory and maritime law enforcement jurisdiction. With its own
sovereign claim and subsequent legal justification, China has pursued
operational jurisdiction of its near seas through civil maritime rights
enforcement.7 China’s actions, all below the level of armed conflict,
are creating two separate and ultimately incompatible systems—the
Chinese dominion of its near seas and the international rule of the global
maritime commons.
One example of system-level power projection appropriate for
the situation in the South and East China Seas would be the US Navy
maintaining maritime presence and movement as well as conducting
information operations across legal, economic, and financial dimensions
below the level of armed conflict. In this manner, the United States can
help other countries in the region maintain a “free and open Indo-Pacific”
to “win before fighting.” 8 From a multidimensional perspective, Chinese
strategy is based upon a profound and fundamental miscalculation that
will ultimately cause its unraveling.
China’s physical and legal segmentation of its near seas has
resulted in a new system boundary that can be exploited to US
advantage. On one side, the maritime commons is a globally scaled,
integrated system of shipborne freight distribution, economic trade,
and financial risk management whose physical passage is guaranteed
under US stewardship and whose contractual redress operates under
long-established, internationally accepted law. On the other side, the
emerging Chinese dominion is an extension of recent Chinese law
backed by regular and irregular force. Ninety-five percent of China’s
5      John C. Camillus, “Strategy as a Wicked Problem,” Harvard Business Review, accessed
April 18, 2019.
6      Department of Defense (DoD), The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S.
National Security Objectives in a Changing Environment (Washington, DC: DoD, 2015), 16; Andrew S.
Erickson and Kevin Bond, “Dredging under the Radar: China Expands South Sea Foothold,”
National Interest, August 26, 2015; Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Update: China’s Big Three
Near Completion,” Center for International and Strategic Studies, June 29, 2017; and Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2018, annual report (Washington, DC: OSD, 2018), 12.
7      M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33,
no. 3 (December 2011): 293, 303.
8      Hearing on the United States Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea, 116th Cong. 12
(2019) (statement of ADM Philip S. Davidson, commander, US Indo-Pacific Command).
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foreign trade is seagoing freight contributing more than $2.2 trillion
to China’s gross domestic product; more than 50 percent of that trade
crosses the maritime boundary.9
Using presence and movement, US maritime power projection can
exploit system advantages short of armed conflict (Class: Physical; Source:
US Navy; Payload: Short-term, random, maritime exclusionary zones on
outbound China container ship routes inside the global commons and
outside the force projection range of the Chinese navy; Vector: Military
exercises and maritime law enforcement). These diversions increase the
distances and the durations of container ship voyages—which in turn,
increase the expenses for fuel, labor, and insurance—to deliver real-time
boundary costs that can be matched to China’s gray-zone actions. Russia’s
actions against ships bound for the Ukrainian ports of Berdyansk and
Mariupol demonstrate the costs imposed by such actions.10
Even a single-day diversion increases the costs associated with
keeping merchandise in inventory: the longer voyage not only prevents
cargo from reaching its destination port and being sold on schedule
but also drives up expenses resulting from financing acquisition costs
and shipping fees within the supply chain. If the delays are significant,
forward contracts, financial instruments used to safeguard against prices
changing while merchandise is in transit, may even expire before the
ship reaches port. Fortunately, extensions on these protections can be
purchased—for a “small” fee.
The expenses resulting from the diversion can be amplified
through financial power projection to deliver significantly higher costs
to China’s exports and gross domestic product. A military agency
that requires bunker fuel, Military Sealift Command perhaps, could
increase regional buys of the commodity, which is subject to financial
speculation, immediately before exclusionary zones are established to
drive the price of the resource up (Class: Financial, Source: Military,
Payload: Cost increase, Vector: Purchase). Hedge funds and commodity
brokers sensing a price movement caused by financial power projection
may buy fuel futures hoping to profit from the price change, driving
the price even higher. This scenario provides an example of planned
financial-military power projection naturally stimulating the financialcommercial dimension.
A declaration by the US Department of State of increased risk in
the western Pacific due to militant actions in China’s near seas publicly
justifies the military establishment of exclusionary zones to mitigate the
risk associated with maritime exercises (Class: Diplomatic, Source: US
State Department, Payload: Public declaration, Vector: Media). Such an
action may result in insurance companies raising their rates, making
maritime insurance more expensive and possibly more difficult to
9      “China Trade Profile,” World Trade Organization, accessed March 12, 2019; David C.
Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garafola, War with China: Thinking Through the
Unthinkable (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), 43.
10      Ihor Kabanenko, “Russia’s ‘Boa Constrictor’ Strategy in the Sea of Azov: A Prelude to
Amphibious Landings?,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 89 (June 2018).
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obtain. If risk along a transit route becomes greater, and consequently
more expensive, the costs of shipping and financing goods on that route
likewise increase, and forward contracts may become scarce. In this
example, one instance of a maritime exclusion zone tees up potential
cascades of additional power projections through the informational and
financial networks integrated within the global maritime commons.
Although physical maritime diversions, by nature, affect the
outbound merchandise shipped at the end of supply chains, payloads and
projection vectors can also be designed for upstream processes related
to manufacturing, logistics, or material handling. Interventions—such
as buying or selling primary components of targeted supply chains,
contracting services associated with paired logistics chains, and trading
financial instruments of associated companies—could induce cascading
economic and financial failures and contagions (Class: Financial,
Source: Commercial, Payload: Stock-out/Supply Glut, Vector: Purchase
order). In this context, shipping containers (onboard and in-port),
freight space, bunker fuel, repair parts, stocks, bonds, insurance, loans,
derivatives, futures, forwards, and swaps become targets. When physical
maritime diversions target outbound container ships, ancillary power
projections can target the individual components of China’s exportdriven supply chains.
The integrated, multidimensional power projection, which is all
nonkinetic, demonstrates how America can extract real costs from
China’s export-driven economy. Furthermore, the United States has an
inherent capability to scale the process and its effects through multiple
exclusionary zones to escalate the effects from one container ship to
many, one supply chain to many. Another benefit of brief maritime
diversions is a lower probability of unwanted escalation than other
physical interventions since such actions do not constitute a blockade
nor an embargo and do occur outside the range of China’s blue water
navy as well as at the limit of its missile range. In this case, unified
multidimensional power projection delivers a cost not a threat because
it does not change “the distribution of power during the crisis.” 11
Ultimately, any antagonist’s ability to respond in kind to this scenario is
limited to the reach of its physical power projection capabilities.

Conclusions

Multidimensionality and its essential elements of class, source,
payload, and projection vector offers a simple but abstract means
for analyzing, designing, and modeling unified, multidimensional
campaigns. It enables the tailored application of power using any and all
exploitable advantages across a spectrum of cooperation, competition,
conflict, and combat. Multidimensionality designed for networked and
systemic power projection offers a number of advantages: multiple
paths to the target; indirect, complex, and nonspatial paths; multiple

11      Branislav L. Slantchev, Military Threats: The Cost of Coercion and the Price of Peace (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 66.
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projection vector types; and ballistic, semiautonomous, and autonomous
guidance options.
In designing campaigns against states and their diffused nonstate
power, our campaigns must join military, whole of governmental, and
nationally sourced economic and financial power with extra national
networks and systems. Our campaign planning must unify power
projection across all dimensions to press our advantages, defeat our
adversaries, and maintain our desired strategic balance. In an era of
coercive gradualism, nuclear provocation, and gray-zone competition
that purposefully occupies the space between war and peace,
dimensionality may offer a better, more innovative and imaginative way
to respond to some of the world’s worst actors, while reducing risk and
promoting peace.
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ABSTRACT: This article recounts some of the basic history of laser
weapons in the context of the great-power rivalries of the United
States, Russia, and China. The author then offers his perspective on
the current escalation of investments in high-tech warfare.

D

efense professionals increasingly believe high-energy lasers
(HELs), which achieve continuous power output of at least 20
kilowatts (kW), are technologically mature enough to become
the mainstay weapon of advanced militaries.1 An examination of past
efforts to develop such weapons, however, suggests caution. The history
of actualizing lasers as a weapon can be summarized as one of repeated
attempts to develop ambitious, big-ticket laser weapon systems before the
associated technologies were sufficiently mature. This article argues the
impetus for these premature—and ultimately disappointing—efforts was
overexuberance within America’s national security establishment about
the potential military applications of lasers. This imbalance between
promise and readiness resulted in the United States losing time and
significant sums of money. To support this claim, the article examines
the role of technological hype in the American experience of developing
powerful laser weapons.
Current optimism about laser weapons is far from novel. At the
end of the last millennium, the Chinese “Academy of Military Science,
the People Liberation Army’s leading think tank on future warfare,
believe[d] lasers would likely become an integral aspect of twenty-first
century combat.” 2 At about the same time, the US Defense Science
Board noted in a comprehensive review that such weapons had “the
potential to change future military operations in dramatic ways.” 3 For
more than half a century, several countries—and as with most cuttingedge, defense-related technologies, the United States is the exemplar
case—channeled significant sums into developing antimateriel laser
weapons. But overall, these attempts yielded disappointing results.
1      Jason. D. Ellis, Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects (Washington, DC: Center for a New
American Security, 2015); J. R. Wilson, “At Long Last, Laser Weapons Are Nearing Deployment,”
Military & Aerospace Electronics 28, no. 7 (July 25, 2017); and Andy Extance, “Laser Weapons Get
Real,” Nature 521 (May 2015): 408–10.
2      Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, Pa.:
Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 204.
3      Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L),
Defense Science Board Task Force on High Energy Laser Weapon Systems Applications (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense [DoD], 2001), iv.
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Despite past failures, interest in HEL weapons has not waned. Many
states today are looking to lasers to solve a range of near-term tactical
and longer-term strategic challenges. As a response to the penetration
of its airspace by North Korean drones, for example, South Korea plans
to deploy HEL weapons at its border by 2020.4 Staying with addressing
threats on the Korean Peninsula, US defense planners are exploring a
more ambitious scheme to fit high altitude, long endurance manned or
unmanned aircraft with powerful lasers to intercept North Korean (and
other) ballistic missiles during their boost phase.5
At one level, it is no surprise states would persist in pursuing HEL
weapons. Humans have always sought advantages over each other
through acquiring novel or superior technology. In the high stakes of
war, maintaining a technological edge over adversaries is a life or death
business. Though technologies usually advance incrementally, sometimes a sudden leap forward can lead to high levels of exuberance about
a technology’s potential to alter established ways of doing things.6 For
these reasons, break-through technologies command the imagination of
military leaders. This perspective is especially true for states that pursue
qualitative rather than quantitative advantages during arms races.7 As
Henry A. Kissinger wrote shortly before lasers were first successfully
tested, “Every country lives with the nightmare that even if it puts
forth its best efforts its survival may be jeopardized by a technological
breakthrough on the part of its opponent.” 8
The laser possesses desirable properties emanating from the base
concept of the technology—the production of very intense, highly
focusable light—that make it highly attractive as a potential weapon,
giving early adopters significant advantages.9 The concept of focusing
intense light against an enemy has long piqued the imagination of
warfighters. One legendary account of the Siege of Syracuse in 212 BC
tells of Greek forces setting fire to Roman sails by using mirrors to
create a “flaming death ray” of sunlight.10

  4     KH Digital 2, “S. Korea To Develop Laser Weapons To Counter NK Drones by 2020,” Korea
Herald, January 6, 2017.
  5      Cristina Maza, “U.S. Has a New Plan To Fight North Korea: Shoot Down Kim Jong Un’s
Missiles as They Launch, But Can It Work?,” Newsweek, April 12, 2018.
6      Harro van Lente, Charlotte Spitters, and Alexander Peine, “Comparing Technological Hype
Cycles: Towards a Theory,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 80, no. 8 (October 2013): 1615–28.
   7      Taik-young Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital, and Military Power (London: Routledge,
2012); Samuel P. Huntington, “Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results,” Public Policy 8 (1958): 41–86;
Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, with the assistance of
Donald G. Brennan (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), 497–538; Hedley Bull, The Control
of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age (New York: Praeger, 1961); and Grant
Tedrick Hammond, Plowshares into Swords: Arms Races in International Politics, 1840–1991 (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1993).
8      Henry A. Kissinger, “Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack,” Foreign Affairs 38, no.
3 (July 1960): 557–75.
  9      W. Brian Arthur, “The Structure of Invention,” Research Policy 36, no. 2 (March 2007): 274–87.
10      Jeremy Hsu, “Archimedes’ Flaming Death Ray Was Probably Just a Cannon, Study
Finds,” Christian Science Monitor, June 29, 2010, https://www.csmonitor.com/Science/2010/0629/
Archimedes-flaming-death-ray-was-probably-just-a-cannon-study-finds.
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Regardless of the level of conceptual attractiveness, decisions
to develop any novel technology are taken under conditions of great
uncertainty. For one thing, unforeseen technical hurdles encountered
during development can stymie efforts to produce an operationally
viable system. Even when the technology reaches operational maturity,
end users may struggle to incorporate the new system within their
existing concept of operations or fail to see the value of adopting it in
the first place.11 When it comes to selecting a potential new technology
to mature into a battle-winning weapon, there rarely is ever such a thing
as a sure bet.
Every decision to invest in one technology comes with opportunity
costs. Most countries face something approximating this dilemma,
but it is especially acute for the United States. Current and upcoming
decisions on the allocation of defense resources will have a major bearing
on whether America can hold its traditional military technological
superiority or will see this advantage erode over time. Indeed, there is
growing concern among many senior defense officials that the United
States is falling behind competitors, particularly China, who have
embarked on ambitious plans to develop emerging technologies with
military uses.12
At present, the vast majority of US defense investments go into
long-cycle programs to build successors to legacy systems. Critics
believe this approach undermines the American goal of maintaining
military technological advantage. Instead, they propose the US military
should focus more on harnessing new and emerging innovations, such
as artificial intelligence and robotics, in order to retain the country’s
technological edge over its adversaries.13
Decisions about which technologies to develop into future weapon
systems may be complicated by the influence of hype, which has long
been recognized in business literature.14 Hype can result in certain
technologies attracting attention and resources disproportionate to their
realistically known attributes. At worst, it can result in betting on the
wrong horse. The analyses derived from this case study have implications
for US strategists and defense planners charged with the difficult task of
trying to achieve offset advantage by successfully leveraging America’s
technological prowess at a time of downward pressure on defense
spending and an upward pressure of spiraling costs.

11      Ash Rossiter, “Drone Usage by Militant Groups: Exploring Variation in Adoption,” Defense
& Security Analysis 34, no. 2 (2018).
12      Cade Metz, “Artificial Intelligence Is Now a Pentagon Priority. Will Silicon Valley Help?,”
New York Times, August 26, 2018.
13      John McCain, “Remarks by Senator John McCain at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce”
(speech, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Procurement Council Policy Meeting, Washington, DC, July
29, 2015).
14      Mads Borup et al., “The Sociology of Expectations in Science and Technology,” Technology
Analysis and Strategic Management 18, no. 3–4 (July–September 2006): 285–298; and Harro van Lente,
Promising Technology: The Dynamics of Expectations in Technological Developments (Eburon: Delft, 1993).
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Initial Hype

As mentioned above, the level of interest a new piece of technology
garners is influenced by its envisioned applications. Thus, when the laser
was first demonstrated, it was said to be a solution in search of a problem.
Before long, however, analysts started to see lasers as defensive weapons
and possibly even as “the biggest breakthrough in the weapons area
since the atomic bomb.” 15 According to one defense analyst, US military
interest during 1962 was such that “there [was] scarcely an Air Force,
Army, and to a lesser degree, Navy, agency” disinterested in exploring
“some type of basic or applied research or experimental development
with optical masers,” which were the forerunner of lasers.16
Pilot ideas ranged from using lasers as communication conduits to
Chairman Mao Zedong instructing his chief scientist to “organize a
group of people to specifically study [the death ray]. Have a small group
of people specializing in it who do not eat dinner or do other things.” 17
Working from the presupposition that “war has always had offensive
and defensive aspects,” Mao ordered his scientists to think about how
lasers might have defensive uses as well as offensive ones.18 Consequently,
he approved the development of high-powered lasers “to counter high
altitude bombers and reconnaissance platforms” under an advanced
program known as Project 640-3.19 Most early HEL military research
programs funded in the United States were similarly for antiaircraft,
antimissile, and anti-tank systems.20
For those would-be early adopters who tried, producing a viable
HEL weapon proved harder than expected.21 Huge technical obstacles
related to laser power, beam quality and propagation abounded. Early
laser programs at the lower end of the energy spectrum did, however,
lead to many successful military applications in the United States and
the Soviet Union, and later among some European nations. The most
important operational contribution was in laser radars used for remote
sensing, target designation, and range finding.22 By the end of the decade,
the United States had developed bombs with guidance systems that could
home in on light reflected from a pulsed laser beam, ushering in the age
15      Letter from Major General A. Schomburg to Lieutenant General J. H. Hinrichs, January
16, 1962, history office, US Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, AL, quoted in
Robert W. Seidel, “From Glow to Flow: A History of Military Laser Research and Development,”
Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 18, no. 1 (1987): 114.
16      Barry Miller, “Services To Push Optical Maser Effort,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 76
(January 15, 1962): 92–104.
17      “中国激光武器的起步：邓小平指出将是主力装备 [China’s laser weapons commence:
Deng pointed out they will be decisive equipment],” Ifeng, September 9, 2010, quoted in Richard
D. Fisher Jr., China’s Progress with Directed Energy Weapons (testimony, Hearing on China’s Advanced
Weapons, Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC,
February 23, 2017).
18      “China’s laser weapons,” Ifeng.
19      Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, 195–96.
20      Seidel, “From Glow to Flow.”
21      Melissa Olson, “History of Laser Weapon Research,” Leading Edge 7, no. 4 (2012): 28.
22      Vasyl Molenby et al., “Laser Radar: Historical Perspective—From the East to the West,”
Optical Engineering 56, no. 3 (2016).
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of precision-guided munitions, a key component of the Second Offset.23
In the mid- to late 1970s, America significantly scaled up the power
output of chemical lasers.24 This development led some members of the
American and Soviet defense communities to consider lasers an ideal
candidate for ballistic missile defense.25 The prospect of high-energy
lasers altering the strategic balance made the technology highly alluring;
their readiness became a second order consideration.

Strategic Seduction

Because of its minimal diffraction, called collimation, a coherently
emitted laser beam can reach long ranges while maintaining a small,
precise spot of concentrated energy on a chosen target. This attribute
makes lasers conceptually ideal for ballistic missile defense and for
anti-satellite weapons. Indeed, as far back as the early 1960s, the United
States funded research on the effects of high-energy laser pulses on
missile warheads.26 Renewed American interest in lasers for ballistic
missile defense in the early 1980s coincided with theoretical studies on
satellites using small nuclear explosions to “pump” x-ray laser weapons
to defeat such intercontinental weapons. Despite broad skepticism about
megawatt-class nuclear-powered lasers on satellites being feasible in
this role, the concept formed a central plank of the Strategic Defense
Initiative outlined in Reagan’s so-called Star Wars speech.27
Although Moscow did not respond by attempting to develop an
analogous system of space-based nuclear-powered lasers, Soviet leaders
did embark upon a lower cost, asymmetric response, namely, a groundbased laser program for knocking out satellites.28 Following the 1972
treaty banning antiballistic missile systems, the focus shifted toward
producing anti-satellite weapons.29 Complementary to these gamechanging efforts to control space, the Soviet Union designed a module
for combat that included capabilities for carrying, among other items, a
laser weapon capable of disabling enemy satellite electronics. After the
test model failed to reach orbit in 1987, Moscow tried to fit the prototype

23      Peter DeLeon, The Laser-Guided Bomb: Case History of a Development (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 1974).
24      Elihu Zimet and Christopher Mann, Directed Energy Weapons—Are We There Yet? (Washington,
DC: National Defense University, 2009), 2.
25      Ellis, Directed-Energy Weapons, 24; and Bob Preston et al., Space Weapons, Earth Wars (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2002).
26      Seidel, “From Glow to Flow,” 121.
27      Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 370–411; and Leslie H. Gelb, “Vision of Space Defense
Posing New Challenges,” New York Times, March 3, 1985.
28      Stephen M. Meyer, “Soviet Strategic Programmes and the US SDI,” Survival 27, no.
6 (November 1985): 274–92; David Holloway, “The Strategic Defense Initiative and the Soviet
Union,” Daedalus 114, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 257–78; and Don Oberdorfer, “Military Response
Planned to ‘Star Wars,’ Soviet Says,” Washington Post, March 8, 1985.
29      Sebastien Roblin, “Russia’s Cold War Super Weapon (Put Lasers on Everything It Can),”
National Interest, July 16, 2017.
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anti-satellite laser onto a modified military transport aircraft, which was
equally unsuccessful.30
American interest in lasers was also driven not by technological
developments but perception of Soviet progress in this area. Throughout
the latter half of the 1980s, the Pentagon repeatedly warned of a “laser
gap” opening up if the Soviets converted their anti-satellite lasers into
a ballistic missile defense system.31 Despite considerable scientific
research, though, the Soviet Union failed to take HELs past a nascent
prototype.32 The myth of the Soviet “killer” laser nonetheless kept US
military research money channeled toward lasers.33 American research
and development (R&D) spending on HELs peaked in 1989, but fell off
rapidly after Moscow’s slow progress became evident.
Undeterred by technical hurdles and tremendous development
costs, the United States pursued lasers for ballistic missile defense
through the mid-1990s. The Air Force initiated the Airborne Laser
project, which entailed aircraft carrying lasers above the dense layer
of atmosphere at 12,000 meters. Beams emitted from the chemically
powered onboard devices were expected to cause an enemy’s ballistic
missile fuel storage tank to explode at ranges of hundreds of kilometers.
But after three-and-a-half decades of underperformance, HELs still
generated tremendous hype.
Commenting on the project in 1997, Secretary of the Air Force Sheila
E. Widnall declared, “It isn’t very often an innovation comes along that
revolutionizes our operational concepts, tactics, and strategies. You can
probably name them on one hand—the atomic bomb, the satellite, the
jet engine, stealth, and the microchip. It’s possible the airborne laser
is in this league.” 34 Despite high expectations—and a successful test
against a missile in flight—size, weight, and power issues plagued the
project. With $5 billion spent before the program was canceled in 2012,
the chemical laser could only be carried by a Boeing 747, and the weak
beam required the aircraft to orbit extremely close to an adversary’s
launch sites.35
The prospect of potentially upending strategic calculations, rather
than the estimated merits of the technology, best accounts for much
of the sustained hype in HEL weapons. As some point out, ballistic
missile defense is “an issue heavily encrusted with multiple policy
and ideological considerations lying outside the general parameters of
30      Alexander Korolkov, “Laser Warfare: Sci-fi Fantasy or Future Reality,” Russia Beyond,
November 18, 2014.
31      Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union
Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 258–61.
32      Bengt Anderberg and Myron L. Wolbarsht, Laser Weapons: The Dawn of a New Military Age
(New York: Plenum Press, 1992), 133.
33      Frank von Hippel and Thomas B. Cochran, “The Myth of the Soviet ‘Killer’ Laser,” New
York Times, August 19, 1989.
34      Angelo M. Codevilla, “This Missile Defense Program Just Won’t Fly,” Wall Street Journal,
October 22, 1997.
35      “Airborne Laser System (ABL) YAL 1A,” Air Force Technology, accessed April 9, 2019; and
Katie Drummond, “RIP, Raygun: Pentagon’s Laser Plane Laid to Rest,” Wired, February 21, 2012.
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whether or not the critical intercept technologies actually work.” 36 Large
defense contractors also likely have incentives to tout the possibilities for
lasers given the potential reward of government funding for high risk,
high reward research.

Promise-Readiness Equilibrium

In the early twenty-first century, America’s emphasis shifted from
pursuing ambitious airborne and space-based kilowatt-class laser
projects to developing less powerful devices intended to intercept
smaller objects over shorter distances.37 Cold War priorities—especially
the “hard kill” of ballistic missiles—required incredibly powerful lasers
that could apply beams accurately on a target for several seconds over
great distances. Laser systems for defeating small objects over shorter
ranges have lower technical requirements.
While laser weapons can potentially kill targets in the open faster
and at much greater ranges, they cannot fire in a ballistic arc over a hill
or over the horizon like conventional artillery without a sophisticated
relay of mirrors.38 Other properties of HEL systems do, however, give
them comparative advantages over conventional weapons for point
defense against rockets, artillery, mortars, and other small objects.
Laser weapon systems can fire quickly and engage multiple targets
simultaneously, and depending on the power source, they potentially
have a limitless magazine.
Unlike most conventional kinetic weapons, lasers can produce
tailored effects to cause a specified level of damage to a target and to
minimize collateral damage. The cost per shot is potentially negligible,
which makes laser weapon systems a cost-effective, long-term option
for intercepting numerous, inexpensive targets. This favorable costexchange equation is an important budgetary attribute in a world where
weaker opponents can use plentiful, cheap weapons to overwhelm more
technological advanced nations.39
American laser projects for countering rockets, artillery, and mortars
in the 2000s initially built upon prototypes of the much more powerful
devices developed and tested in the 1980s and 1990s, such as the joint
US-Israeli tactical high-energy laser demonstrator.40 Though this system
successfully destroyed rocket, artillery, and mortar rounds in flight
during field tests between 2000 and 2005, major challenges associated
with portability, the logistics of handling hazardous chemicals, and
36      Roger Handberg, Ballistic Missile Defense and the Future of American Security: Agendas, Perceptions,
Technology, and Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 3.
37      Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Laser Weapons: Lower Expectations, Higher Threats,” Breaking
Defense, May 19, 2014.
38      Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004), 53.
39      T.X. Hammes, “Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance,” Joint Forces
Quarterly 81 (2nd Quarter 2016): 76–85.
40      Kenneth Katzman, Israel: Missile Defense Cooperation with the United States, RS20516 (Washington,
DC: CRS, 2000).
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escalating costs led to the program’s cancelation.41 By 2007, the Defense
Science Board pointed to “lack of progress” and a “marked decline in
interest on the part of operational customers, force providers, and industry,” indicating pessimism about the near-term viability of tactical
HELs had returned.42 Consequently, the United States curtailed much
of its spending on HELs.43
Some efforts to develop tactical lasers within the 10 to 100 kW
range did continue, focusing on resolving size, weight, and power
incompatibilities with operational platforms. The Army’s 10-kW highenergy laser mobile demonstrator and the Navy’s 30-kW laser weapon
system provide notable examples of systems on platforms.44 To enhance
operational viability during the last decade, researchers developed fiber
lasers to be compact and below the high-energy power threshold. The
ability to combine their beams coherently allows the total output power
to be increased while maintaining good beam quality.45 Driven by greater
commercial interest, the parallel development of fiber lasers as well as
image-recognition and targeting systems increase beam accuracy, range,
and quality while reducing the size and the weight of the weapon systems
relative to their power output.46 This new innovation infrastructure has
closed the gap between the promise and technological readiness of
tactical laser weapon systems.
More states are now developing such systems. Britain, for example,
plans to test its combined fiber laser weapon, dubbed the Dragonfire,
against land and sea targets by 2019.47 Similar projects are underway in
many other technologically advanced nations, especially China.48 Thus,
tactical lasers have likely reached a point of maturity whereby they will
soon be fielded in a greater number of real operational settings.49
41      Sharon Weinberger, “Laser Weapons Better Against Rockets?,” Wired, February 25, 2008;
Michael R. Dahlberg and Michael E. Cochrane, “Tactical High-Energy Laser (THEL) as a Weapon
System in Future Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD),” ed. Ernest A. Dorko, Proceedings of
the Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers (SPIE) 3612 (June 1999): 111–16.
42      AT&L, Defense Science Board Task Force on Directed Energy Weapons (Washington, DC: DoD,
2007), ix.
43      Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-Energy
Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2012), 56.
44      Joseph Trevithick, “The US Army’s Laser-Armed Stryker Has Blasted Dozens of Drones,”
The Drive, April 17, 2017; “HEL MD Destroys Mortars Midflight,” Boeing, accessed April 15, 2019;
and Kashmira Gander and Rob Williams, “Laser Gun: US Navy Unveils New Weapon with Video
Showing Speedboat Explosion,” Independent, December 10, 2014.
45      Zejin Liu et al., “High-Power Coherent Beam Polarization Combination of Fiber Lasers:
Progress and Prospect [Invited],” Journal of the Optical Society of America B 34, no. 3 (2017): A7–
A14; and Zejin Liu et al., “Coherent Beam Combining of High Power Fiber Lasers: Progress and
Prospect,” Science China Technological Sciences 56, no. 7 (July 2013): 1597–1606.
46      “Fiber Laser Applications,” SPI Lasers, accessed April 15, 2019; and Extance, “Laser
Weapons,” 410.
47      “Case Study: UK Dragonfire—Transforming Future Weapons Technology,” QinetiQ blog,
November 23, 2017.
48      Liu Zhen, “How China’s Military Has Zeroed In on Laser Technology,” South China Morning
Post, May 4, 2018; David Szondy, “Rheinmetall’s 50kW High-Energy Laser Weapon Successfully
Passes Tests,” News Atlas, December 20, 2012; and Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkish Indigenous Laser
Weapon Advances,” Defense News, February 14, 2015.
49      Ellis, Directed-Energy Weapons, 4.
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Despite these advances, tactical HEL weapon systems remain bulky,
costly, and sensitive to vibration—features warfighters do not find
appealing. Furthermore, the systems require highly skilled operators
and maintenance crews to keep them functioning. Yet the smaller and
more efficient laser systems become, the more likely it is that militaries
will look to use them for point defense or for protecting expeditionary
ground, naval, and air assets.50

Great-Power Rivalry

Against the backdrop of today’s great-power rivalry, some types
of sophisticated HEL systems are viewed as potential solutions to key
problems in power projection (in the case of the United States) or as a
means of exploiting a critical vulnerability of an adversary (in the case
of China and Russia). Aside from ballistic missile defense, America’s
most ambitious efforts enhance the survivability of air, and potentially
maritime, platforms in an anti-access/area denial environment. This
capability is especially relevant in the western Pacific, where China
has fielded a series of interrelated missile, sensor, guidance, and other
technologies to restrict regional access, threatening core international
security interests.51
The success or failure of the US response to this challenge is highly
contingent on the ability to penetrate heavily defended airspace.52 In
this context, the possibility of plane-mounted lasers for air platform
survival generates considerable hype in the United States. Size, weight,
and power issues as well as targeting considerations—not least, keeping
a beam focused on the vulnerable spot of a target for a minimum dwell
time to achieve a “kill”—make fitting laser systems onto fast-moving
air platforms tremendously more challenging than mounting a device
on a ship or vehicle.
Nonetheless, by 2021, the Air Force hopes to demonstrate a 50-kW
airborne laser can feasibly acquire, track, aim, and fire a beam at a
dynamic target, such as an incoming missile, from a fighter jet traveling
at transonic and supersonic speeds.53 By 2030, the United States
expects to arm an aircraft with high-energy lasers capable of defending
itself against integrated air defenses.54 Clearly, the allure of lasers as a
revolutionary technology has returned, and not just in America.
Russia and China consider lasers a means of obviating key US
advantages in space such as satellite-based military reconnaissance and
50      Ellis, Directed-Energy Weapons, 38.
51      Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/
Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security
41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 7. See also, Evan Braden Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Western
Pacific: China’s Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” International Security 38, no. 4 (Spring
2014): 115–49.
52      Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial
Challenges (Washington, DC: Air-Sea Battle Office, 2013), 3.
53      GEN James “Mike” Holmes, “Directed Energy Summit” (speech, Directed Energy Summit,
Washington, DC, March 29, 2017).
54      Holmes, “Directed Energy Summit.”
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surveillance as well as satellite-based communications that can affect
economic transactions. Thus, fielding anti-satellite systems makes sense
to America’s adversaries. As Daniel R. Coats, the director of the Office
of National Intelligence, told lawmakers, “Russia and China perceive a
need to offset any US military advantage derived from military, civil,
or commercial space systems and are increasingly considering attacks
against satellite systems as part of their future warfare doctrine.” 55
Given the sensitivities surrounding Russian defense projects, it is
difficult to gauge progress accurately, however, some evidence suggests
Russia has revived its original airborne laser weapon project for antisatellite capabilities.56 Consistent with Moscow’s record of exaggeration,
Russian defense officials have also recently boasted of an impending
breakthrough in laser weapons.57 In contrast, Beijing’s efforts to develop
laser weapons to counter space advantages became apparent during the
late 1990s only when reports on “Chinese efforts to purchase or develop
low- and high-powered laser technology, [radio frequency] jammers, and
other capabilities that could be used against satellites” surfaced.58 A more
recent report confirmed China’s 2005 success “of a ground-based laser
weapon that was used to ‘blind’ an orbiting satellite.” 59 More recently,
the Chinese government allowed scientists to speculate the country
could develop a space-based laser weapon to target satellites.
Therefore, a major breakthrough in HEL weapons, especially in a
period of rising tensions, could be highly destabilizing. China would
view an increased US ability to penetrate its anti-access/area denial
environment with alarm. Likewise, the United States would consider
the development of more advanced anti-satellite laser weapon systems
provocative. But given the long lead times involved in maturing and
testing HEL weapon systems, surprises are unlikely. Furthermore, there
are other ways to destroy or disrupt satellites.60
To be sure, guard must be kept against being surprised by leapahead technologies. But as current confrontations attest, states are
just as likely to be surprised, and perhaps outmaneuvered, by enemies
creatively employing simple and established technologies. Moreover,
the biggest threats to American satellites are perhaps nonkinetic, such
as the jamming of satellite-based positioning and communications

55      Hearing on Worldwide Threats Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 115th Cong. (2017)
(statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence), 8.
56      Patrick Tucker, “China, Russia Building Attack Satellites and Space Lasers: Pentagon Report,”
Defense One, February 12, 2019.
57      “Russia’s Hypersonic Ballistic Missile and Laser System in Final Tests, Putin Says,” Moscow
Times, April 11, 2019.
58      Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving
Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 245.
59      Bill Gertz, “Get Ready for China’s Laser-Weapons Arsenal,” National Interest, April 12, 2017.
60      Sandra Erwin, “U.S. Intelligence: Russia and China Will Have ‘Operational’ Anti-Satellite
Weapons in a Few Years,” Space News, February 14, 2018.
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capabilities.61 But anti-satellite laser weapons hold a unique niche in
conducting difficult-to-attribute attacks due to the difficulty of proving
if a satellite failure was caused by a technical issue or an attack.62
Global power distribution differs much from the Cold War when
the United States lacked a technological peer. China is already fielding
comparable, if not superior, weapon systems and investing in such military innovations as robotics, artificial intelligence, and autonomous
vehicles. In all these cases, commercialization feeds technology development and eases acquisition costs.
Conversely, powerful HELs have a small, albeit growing, commercial
footprint that results in the majority of R&D funding coming from
defense sources. Moreover, the United States placed severe export
restrictions on end-state and component technologies. As a consequence,
China and Russia will likely find it more difficult to keep pace with
developments in advanced HEL systems, especially those designed for
air, maritime, and ballistic missile defense. These lasers could remain
an area of technological competition in which America can potentially
maintain significant long-term advantages.

Conclusion

Despite the hype and the disappointment associated with emerging
technologies and the reality that research funding evaporates in the
absence of immediate success, high-energy lasers are an anomaly.63 At their
inception, lasers were not a solution-orientated defense technology. Over
time, however, the potential for one laser that can perform a variety of
weaponized tasks contributed to the technology’s enduring attractiveness
to the defense industry. Large defense contractors, incentivized by the
prospect of securing government funding for conducting high-risk
R&D, have likely encouraged additional hype about the possibilities
of developing and fielding ambitious laser weapon systems. Defeating
ballistic missiles has been the primary rationale for their development,
but enthusiasm for the potential of lasers in an air platform defense role
within an anti-access/area denial environment exists.
Unlike the hypothetical megawatt weapons or the highly
sophisticated systems being developed for air platform survival, groundbased and ship- and vehicle-mounted tactical lasers have established an
operational viability. This role is especially useful for countering rockets,
artillery, and mortars as well as defeating cheap, plentiful drones and
small, unmanned, boats. At a time of downward pressure on Western
61      Lin Jinshun et al., “Countermeasure Technology for MMW Satellite Links,” Aerospace
Electronic Warfare, October 2012, 20–22, referenced by David D. Chen (testimony, Hearing on China’s
Advanced Weapons, Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February
23, 2017).
62      Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Thomas G. Roberts, Space Threat Assessment 2018
(Washington DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies [CSIS], April 2018), 10.
63      van Lente, Promising Technology; Jon Guice, “Designing the Future: The Culture of New
Trends in Science and Technology,” Research Policy 28, no. 1 (January 1999): 81–98; and Daniel E.
O’Leary, “Gartner’s Hype Cycle and Information System Research Issues,” International Journal of
Accounting Information Systems 9, no. 4 (2008): 240–52.
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defense budgets, the full integration of high-energy lasers into future
warfighting concepts will depend on overcoming the reputation of
exaggerated expectations and poor technical outcomes, such as the
degradation of laser propagation through the atmosphere.
Calculating precisely the part hype has played in the technological
maturation of HELs and their ostensible readiness in a tactical role today
is hard. Because hype helps to channel resources at critical junctures in the
innovation life cycle, it may prove a significant factor in the emergence of
some long-fuse technologies.64 Enthusiasm for a particular technology
may not be ill-placed. An unrealistic appreciation of the timeframe for
its readiness, however, is often the problem: “We invariably overestimate
the short-term impact of a truly transformational discovery, while
underestimating its longer-term effects.” 65 As America’s military seeks
to retain its edge, the experience for developing laser weapons should
serve as a warning about being drawn in by a technology’s promise to
deliver rapid advantages.
With little commercial interest in powerful HELs until recently, the
industry has relied on enduring military interest and the corresponding
allocation of R&D defense dollars to fund crucial advances in the
technology. In contrast, much of the technology identified in the Third
Offset Strategy is being developed in the commercial sector for civilian
uses. The United States is attempting to leverage its technological
superiority beyond commercial, off-the-shelf technologies that are
also available to its adversaries. Unique advantages can only be derived
from greater symbiosis between military and commercial innovation.66
America would therefore do well to invest its defense R&D funds in an
array of emerging technologies and across the full industry ecosystem,
including nondefense commercial firms, to see what grows over time.
The Department of Defense should follow this approach to maintain
technological military superiority rather than allowing money to
follow hype.

64      van Lente, Spitters, and Peine, “Comparing Technological Hype Cycles.”
65      Francis S. Collins, “A Genome Story: 10th Anniversary Commentary by Francis Collins,”
Guest Blog, Scientific American, June 25, 2010.
66      Arati Prabhakar in Kathleen H. Hicks et al., Assessing the Third Offset Strategy (Washington,
DC: CSIS, 2017), 8.
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ABSTRACT: This article identifies the key components of an
innovation ecosystem that can assist in developing nontraditional
defense resources to cope with rapidly evolving technology threats.
These components include organizational culture, an awareness of
emerging technologies, a capacity for leveraging resources, and a
strategy for absorbing external information.

F

or more than three years, the US Department of Defense
(DoD) has been improving how it innovates in the face of
rapid technological change. Dozens of departmental, service,
and agency initiatives have emerged to address different aspects of the
innovation problem. Significant energy has gone into linking these diverse
efforts more comprehensively and collaboratively beyond the traditional
defense community. But more thought must be given to the institutional
competencies the DoD needs to become a focal point for creative and
entrepreneurial problem solving.
The First and Second Offsets, for example, addressed a specific
military-strategic calculus, namely overcoming the Soviet military’s
numerical superiority. In contrast, the Third Offset has taken this focus
one step further by attempting to reinvent “the process of harnessing
innovation to meet new enemies wherever and whenever they arise.” 1
Accordingly, the top-down approach to capability development that
characterized the Cold War is ill-suited for the present era.
Instead, the DoD needs a more dynamic model—one in which tacit
knowledge encoded in networks of practitioners across the military
enterprise drives new capabilities. Such a strategy means creating the
capacity to innovate by aligning demand (from technology operators)
with supply (the providers of global technologies). Building this capacity
within the DoD can enhance its organizational culture, processes, and
workforce—namely, enabling entrepreneurial competencies prevalent
in the most competitive innovation ecosystems, such as Silicon Valley.
As part of the Third Offset, the Army established a Futures
Command that will consolidate core modernization functions into
a single organization. This command must place a premium on
entrepreneurial competencies to capitalize on new sources of talent,

1      Damon V. Coletta, “Navigating the Third Offset Strategy,” Parameters 47, no. 7 (Winter
2017–18): 50.
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ideas, and resources.2 This article outlines those competencies and
discusses each of them in terms of the value it brings to the Army.

Innovation Ecosystem

We can trace the contemporary idea of innovation to Joseph A.
Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development (Theorie de Wirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung), which appeared in 1934.3 Schumpeter argued economic
and social change came about when technology and business innovators
recognized gaps and opportunities within the chaos of a competitive
environment and reacted to it by offering new products and services.
An innovation ecosystem, in effect, is the collective environment
consisting of economic, networking, and physical assets as well as
Schumpeter’s technology and business innovators (change agents) that
facilitate the transfer and application of knowledge and associated
technological value creation.4
Within an innovation ecosystem, one can find diverse, interconnected
participants and resources. These components include the human capital
(students, faculty, staff, industry researchers, and industry representatives) and the material resources (financial resources, equipment, and
facilities) that make up institutions (universities, colleges of engineering,
business schools, business firms, venture capitalists, industry-university
research institutes, federal or industry-supported centers, state or local
economic development, business assistance organizations, funding
agencies, and policy makers).5
The Army can develop a network among such stakeholders to
promote value-maximizing behaviors associated with the efficient transfer
and utilization of tacit knowledge as well as to improve organizational
flexibility and openness that are critical for innovation. A number of
barriers stand in the way of achieving such outcomes in traditional
military organizations, however. Among these impediments are the
rigid formalisms governing complex decision-making in the military
that are manifested in the hierarchical organizational structure, strict
job specializations, distinct divisions of labor, and highly authoritarian
culture.6 Another is the Army’s lack of a true innovation culture.7
Innovative organizations implement an open strategy based
upon the principle that “not all the smart people work for us.” With
this approach, the Army must learn to connect more effectively with
smart people outside its organization to create a multiplicative network.
2      Helene Cooper, “Army, Struggling To Get Technology in Soldiers’ Hands, Tries the
Unconventional,” New York Times, March 18, 2018.
3      Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital,
Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1934).
4      Bruce Katz and Julie Wagner, The Rise of Innovation Districts: A New Geography of Innovation in
America (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2014).
5      Deborah H. Jackson, “What Is an Innovation Ecosystem,” Engineering Research Center,
March 15, 2011.
6      Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).
7      COL Eric E. Aslakson, “The Army Is Falling Short in Developing Creative Leaders,”
Association of the United States Army, May 4, 2016.
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Embracing the ideas in these external links will, in turn, amplify the
advantage of internal efforts.8 Similarly, the Army needs to consider how
to leverage the theory of lead-user innovation, which entails identifying
sophisticated consumers who typically modify or invent products to
satisfy their own needs as an important source of innovation outside
the firm. Lead users can help the Army by becoming a source of new
ideas capable of augmenting traditional product development within
an organization.9
Admittedly, successful implementation of these innovation strategies
presents challenges for the military services. Factors such as cultural
idiosyncrasies, security, and policy constraints impede free-flowing
interaction between the Army and important segments of high-tech
industry. While firms operating in nondefense markets are a potential
source of new, competitively differentiated technologies and business
approaches, the Defense Business Board indicated the defense market
is generally not attractive to commercial firms. This fact is due in part
to the complex regulatory, policy, and process provisions governing
defense acquisition, which represent a significant barrier to entry for
firms pursuing mainly higher margin commercial markets.10
Nonetheless, the Army still needs an approach to technological
innovation that enables it to create options across a diverse spectrum
of potential solutions, such as cybersecurity, autonomy, and artificial
intelligence, necessary for maintaining military advantage.11 The
Defense Innovation Initiative was launched in 2014 to begin addressing
this need.12 Since then, numerous internal initiatives have developed to
connect the Defense Department to the participants and the resources
necessary for a more flexible, resilient innovation posture.
Two prominent examples are the Defense Innovation Unit, which
provides a channel for procuring commercial products that address
military needs, and the MD5 National Security Technology Accelerator,
which catalyzes the creation of startups that solve significant defense
and security problems. The conceptual basis framing these initiatives
also informs the Army’s effort to internalize a set of competencies
associated with innovating organizations—opportunity development,

8      Henry Chesbrough, “Managing Open Innovation,” Research Technology Management 47, no. 1
(2004): 23–26.
9      Eric Von Hippel, “Lead Users: A Source of Novel Product Concepts,” Management Science
32, no. 7 (1986): 791–805.
10      Defense Business Board, Innovation: Attracting and Retaining the Best of the Private Sector
(Washington, DC: Defense Business Board, 2014).
  11      Andrew P. Hunter and Ryan A. Crotty, Keeping the Technological Edge: Leveraging outside
Innovation To Sustain the Department of Defense’s Technological Advantage (Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2015).
12      Richard M. Jones, Defense Secretary Hagel Launches Defense Innovative Initiative, American
Institute of Physics, November 18, 2014; and Chuck Hagel to the deputy secretaries of defense,
memorandum, OSD013411-14, “The Defense Innovation Initiative,” November, 15, 2014,
Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC.
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championing, resource leveraging, and location leveraging—that will
enable the full advantages of an expanded innovation ecosystem.13

Supporting Interviews

To confirm the key components of an innovation ecosystem, we
conducted 11 interviews in person, via telephone, by questionnaire,
and through direct observation in formal and informal settings
between January 2017 and October 2017. This qualitative method
provided a rich understanding of the context of innovation within the
DoD community in general and the Army in particular. We collected
additional data through primary and secondary historical research and
analysis based on news and industry reports and social media coverage.
Using these inductive methods, we built on existing concepts in research
on innovation ecosystems while exploring new strategies, processes,
and relationships.
The interview data was initially analyzed to confirm the centrality of
four previously identified competencies in the Army and the Department
of Defense.14 Respondents mentioned the word “champion” a total of
62 times; “resources,” 53 times; “location,” 51 times; and “opportunity,”
42 times. Based on the confirmatory evidence, we organized the
respondent data according to these four themes. Several other words
such as “bureaucracy,” “ideas,” “trust,” “participative,” and “incentive,”
were also prevalent. We determined these keywords correlated to one
or more of the underlying themes and decided against separating them.
Due to the relatively small sample size limiting the impact of
biases, we do not claim the findings can be broadly generalized. Such
qualitative approaches, however, can “close in on real-life situations and
test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice”
even for small sample sizes.15 In order to minimize the potential of
verification bias, we asked open-ended, nondirectional questions.
This approach, as well as an interview protocol appropriate for the
participants’ depth and breadth of experience, allowed us to gain richer,
more holistic perspectives.

Implications

Several areas immediately challenge the Army’s efforts to activate an
ecosystem that increases its innovation capacity. Interviewees perceived
risk aversion as endemic to the Army bureaucracy and deeply embedded
in the organizational culture. This risk aversion and the stigma associated
with perceptions of failure in the institutional Army were contrasted with

13      Adam Jay Harrison, Bharat Rao, and Bala Mulloth, Developing an Innovation-Based Ecosystem at
the U.S. Department of Defense: Challenges and Opportunities, Defense Horizons 81 (Washington, DC:
National Defense University, 2017); and Bharat Rao and Bala Mulloth, “The Role of Universities
in Encouraging Growth of Technology-Based New Ventures,” International Journal of Innovation and
Technology Management 14, no. 4 (2016).
14      Harrison, Rao, and Mulloth, Developing an Innovation-Based Ecosystem.
15      Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings of Case Study Research,” Qualitative Inquiry 12,
no. 2 (2006): 219–45.
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the spirit of ingenuity and adaptation exhibited by the tactical military.
Moreover, respondents suggested that not constructively acknowledging
failure constrains organizational learning normally associated with
iterative problem-solving approaches. Such a culture of risk avoidance
also impacts professional development, whereby individuals electing to
pursue career paths outside the norm do so at the expense of future
choice assignments and promotion. Here, the check-the-box mentality
of advancement limits the personal and professional diversity of the
Army workforce necessary for innovation.
Several of our interviewees highlighted that mindset and systemic
conservatism lead individuals to resist innovative approaches that might
challenge existing organizational and behavioral norms. There is a
tendency, according to Stam, to “not care about getting it right but rather
care about delivering the product on time.” 16 Respondents generally
painted a picture of an Army bureaucracy that takes innovation for
granted as a natural output of a more or less static process rather than
as a living system of experimenting and learning. Such a mindset fails
to emphasize opportunities for continuous improvement and causes
military organizations to be, as Porkolab noted, “reactionary instead
of proactive.” 17
While recent progress was acknowledged with respect to the
Department of Defense accessing new sources of innovation, respondents
agreed such activity suffers from a lack of resources and institutional
buy-in necessary to implement innovation successfully. Several subjects
highlighted the failure to reconcile newer innovation approaches, such
as crowdsourcing, hackathons, and innovation challenges that are
currently in vogue in defense circles, with the core roles, missions, and
functions of the military. In effect, this contrast creates an environment
in which bottom-up innovation takes place without being internalized
by the institution in meaningful ways.

Recommendations

With the creation of the Futures Command, a number of tangible,
near-term opportunities, ranging from training and education programs
to partnership and organizational models, provide the Army with a
mechanism for internalizing the innovation competencies explored
above. Though incomplete, the following recommendations represent
respondents’ feedback that can be pursued as part of or as adjuncts to
the Futures Command construct.
Training and education. A competencies-based approach to the
development of in-depth innovation capacity starts with people.
Therefore, the Army should deploy training and education resources
supporting the self-initiated, discovery-based problem solving.

16      Allan Stam (dean, Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of
Virginia), interview by the authors, March 31, 2017.
17      BG Imre Porkolab (Hungarian Ministry of Defense and former Supreme Allied Commander
Transformation’s Representative to the Pentagon), interview by the authors, June 19, 2017.
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Innovation training and education programs should be structured to
attract talent external to the Army’s traditional technology development
efforts, including those who would not otherwise be aware of the
opportunities to work on military and civil-military issues.
One option to address this objective involves expanding Army
engagement with programs like Hacking for Defense, a universitybased experiential education program that aligns Army-sponsored
challenges with student teams. Now offered at more than 18 universities
around the United States, this program reinforces the opportunity
development competency for students and Army problem sponsors.
Hacking for Defense also promotes the creation of networks between
the Army and student-innovators in key innovation geographies
around the country to build the resource and the location leveraging
competencies simultaneously.
Additional opportunities for training and education involve the
deployment of professional military education and skills-based training
for the internal Army workforce to develop a cadre of personnel able to
navigate bureaucratic obstacles to technological change and innovation.
Training and education should cover topics like entrepreneurial
leadership, leading change, problem framing, design thinking, social
networking, innovation culture, organizational design, talent and risk
management, and strategic technology literacy. Classes should augment
the Army’s current education in science, technology, engineering,
mathematics, and management as per the 2014 recommendations of the
National Research Council.18 A recent example of this approach has been
successfully demonstrated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in
a program called the MD5 Boot Camp, a one-week curriculum that
focuses on innovation skills development.
Distributed networks. Our respondents emphasized the importance of
human-centered networks as a basis for opportunity development and
as a means to organize resources and location-based benefits. The Army
should activate extended networks of entrepreneurs, technologists, and
other partners through a portfolio of programs that promote information
exchanges required to connect the tangible and intangible assets—such
as people, technology, capital, and infrastructure as well as the problems,
customers, intellectual property, technical expertise, market information,
partnership vehicles, and sales channels—necessary to conceptualize,
build, and validate innovative solutions for Army problems.
Human-centered networking programs should first and foremost
facilitate knowledge sharing between Army stakeholders and
collaborators across government, academia, and industry. The Open
Campus initiative, for example, offers academic and industry researchers
opportunities to work alongside their counterparts at Army Research
Laboratory facilities. Open Campus also includes a handful of extended
sites where the Army researchers from these facilities are forward
18      Jacques S. Gansler et al., Review of Specialized Degree-Granting Graduate Programs of the
Department of Defense in STEM and Management (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2014).
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deployed into university communities to capitalize on their unique
attributes.19 This model has successfully demonstrated how the Army
can position its physical and knowledge-based assets in a research and
development context to attract new collaborators. This model could
be replicated in a search for opportunities that support nonresearch
objectives. Uniformed personnel with firsthand knowledge of the
warfighting domain, for example, could be placed at select universities to
stimulate academic thinking on revolutionary warfighting applications
of emerging technology.
Architecture. In addition to developing a human link that can rapidly
deliver private sector innovation for military applications, former
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Frank Kendall called for a new architecture to capitalize on high-tech
ideas that are also required to instantiate in-depth innovation capacity in
the Army.20 Standing up the Futures Command provides the Army with
a unique opportunity to deploy a business system that aligns externally
derived ideas, products, partners, resources, and expertise with the
Army’s concept and capability development to enable high-potential
opportunities to be internalized, scaled, and sustained.
With this objective in mind, the Army should frame the knowledge
and materiel-based outputs of innovation efforts like technology
demonstrations and experiments, crowdsourcing, and collaborative
research and development with key decision points across the capabilitydevelopment enterprise. An example of this approach involves leveraging
entrepreneur-based prototyping associated with activities like hackathons,
crowdsourcing, and challenge prizes to investigate systematically the
implications of emerging technology in application areas relevant to
the Army. Correctly documented, such efforts would provide evidencebased support for concept and requirements development. In the area of
contracting, entrepreneurial networks can provide new insights into the
technological art of the possible that are relevant to acquisition strategy
development and preacquisition market surveys.

Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has built a decisive
military-technological edge as the cornerstone of its national defense
strategy. In an effort to maintain that edge, the Army will spend more
than $10 billion on research and development in fiscal year 2019. While
significant, the Army investment is a small fraction of escalating global
outlays on research and technology. At the same time, the proliferation of
knowledge and creative technologies are displacing traditional, capitalintensive approaches to advanced product development. The fusion of new
physical, digital, and biological technologies characteristic of the Fourth
Industrial Revolution is amplifying the dynamics of creative destruction
with new technology-driven business models that are upending legacy
19      “ARL Open Campus,” Army Research Laboratory, accessed June 30, 2018.
20      Coletta, “Navigating the Third Offset.”

TOC

52

Parameters 48(4) Winter 2018–19

modes of competition at increasing rates. The hallmarks of organizations
that successfully innovate in the age of disruption include characteristics
like openness, connectedness, decentralization, and scalability. Taken
together, the transformation of the R&D landscape from a centralized,
capital-intensive model to a networked, democratic model represents a
significant challenge to many traditional organizations in fast-moving
markets. For the Army, the implications of this change are the impetus,
at least in part, for forming the new Futures Command.
Successfully competing in the new innovation environment requires
more than adjustments to organizations and processes. It demands a
commitment to developing an in-depth innovation capacity—a whole
new set of competencies required for the dynamic organization of people,
problems, technologies, and resources in an innovation ecosystem.
Once established, such an ecosystem, consisting of elements internal
and external to the traditional defense industrial base, will provide a
resilient source of competitively differentiated ideas as well as a means
for discovering unexpected new applications of technology with the
potential to impact Army equities positively.
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Profession at the Crossroads
Lieutenant Colonel Donn A. Starry
The late General Donn A. Starry (1925–2011), former Commanding
General of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (1977–
81), wrote this insightful essay in 1966 while he was attending the
US Army War College. It offers an engaging look at how the US
Army profession viewed itself in the late 1960s. It also reveals how
officers, many as talented as Starry, viewed the “nature of war”
in an era of tremendous technological and socio-cultural change.
Note how Starry wrote of war as potentially shifting “from total,
to limited, to back to total in a completely different sense.” Can
the US Army of today manage such a shift as fluidly as it might be
required to do?

A

s competing worlds seek to expand and promote their respective
ideologies under the nuclear shadow, the very nature of war
itself changes, and with this change come different notions
about the purpose of military force, proper military strategy and tactics,
and the correct goals for military action in the new international arena.
On all sides, there is increasing concern with national security, with the
involvement of civilians in military strategy, and the place of the military
in political affairs. In reflecting this concern, political scientists reanalyze
civil-military relations; social scientists examine the military profession;
business managers and scientists propose new decision making and
management disciplines for government and military organizations; and
scientists and academicians propose new strategies for national defense.
So the defense of the United States, and the military profession
itself, long relatively isolated from national affairs except in crisis, are
today experiencing many of the effects of the changing world.

Changing Patterns of Leadership

The story of the American military profession in modern times
has been described by Janowitz as a struggle between the heroic leader,
embodying the tradition of the mounted warrior, and the military
manager, concerned with the rational and scientific conduct of war.
Since the turn of the century, and more especially since World War II,
technological developments have been so comprehensive as to create an
organizational revolution in the military profession.
As war and war machinery have become more complex, the heroic
traditionalism of the military man has taken root in an organizational
conservatism; a resistance to change based largely on the uncertainties of
war, and the imponderables of planning for the employment of untried
technological advances.

Reprinted from
LTC Donn A. Starry,
“Profession at
the Crossroads,”
US Army War
College Commentary
(February 1967): 16–24.
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The increased destructiveness of military weaponry, a contribution
of technology, weakens traditional distinctions between the role of the
military and that of the civilian. Not only do mass destruction weapons
broaden the menace to the country and society by equalizing in a sense
the risk between soldiers and civilians, but complex technical and
logistics tasks also tend to increase the civilian character of the military
establishment. Involvement of military personnel in highly technical
research and development tasks completes the civilianizing trend of the
non-heroic requirements for modern military leadership.
The ultimate requirement for combat, however, provides an outer
limit to these civilianizing tendencies. Among the platoons, companies,
and battalions of combat divisions, the persistence of the fighter spirit
is an essential characteristic of life, So long as this is the case, the
heroic leader image cannot be cast away. On the other hand, as today’s
professional officer moves from command to staff, from field to research
program, he continually is torn between the traditional hero image of
the warrior class, and the manager-technician demands of burgeoning
science and technology in his profession.

Changing Patterns of Decisionmaking

The complex nature of today’s military problems taxes the
capabilities of traditional methods of military analysis and problem
solving. Problems of which weapons systems to develop, how many
of what weapons to buy, and where to deploy what forces involve so
many complex considerations from cost to national policy, that new
decisionmaking tools are required. In response to the need for new
tools, the academic community has provided a set of systematic, and
where possible, quantitative tools for the solution of complex military
management problems.
Involvement of the academic community in the solution of military
problems is one of the significant aspects of recent times. This
involvement grew out of such events as the World War II participation
of scientific groups in development of operational techniques for
employment of radar in air defense.
Not only were new weapons developed and introduced by scientists
and academicians; but the deployment and employment of the weapons
also were subjected to new analysis techniques—matters long considered
solely as problems for the military professional to solve. This work was
known initially as operations analysis—later operations research. As
time went on, operations research techniques were applied to many
management and strategy problems of the military establishment. How
many bombers should be purchased for the new bomber fleet? Which of
two competing missile systems is the better? Should bombers or missiles
be the main defense? Where should air defense interceptor units be
stationed for best utilization? Such work, including not only operational
matters but also costs, the effectiveness of competing systems, and many
other factors, has come to be known as systems analysis.
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As the purely military ingredient of an equation increases, and a
tactical problem of combat is to be solved, systems analysis, as yet, has
limited application. When such factors as terrain advantage, beach and
sea conditions, state of morale, and the training status of troops must
be weighed and a decision reached quickly, systems analysis, at present
at any rate, is too cumbersome to be useful. On the other hand, caution
must be exercised in propounding this viewpoint dogmatically. What
is immeasurable today may be measurable tomorrow. As science learns
more about conflict in war games, game theory studies, the science of
cybernetics, and related activities, new paths will be opened for analytical
treatment of military combat.

The Changing Nature of War

In spite of its violence and horror, war historically has been an
essential institution of relations between states. In particular, the
nation state system has relied on war as the final arbiter between states
that have irreconcilable grievances. Presidents Polk and McKinley
deliberately used war as an instrument of American policy, unpleasant
but necessary. President Wilson, without really planning participation,
became engulfed inextricably in World War I as a foreign policy response.
By Franklin Roosevelt’s time, war had been magnified to awesome
totality; an instrument of defense in the extremity of a total struggle for
national survival.
What then is war today? Is it a useful arbiter among nations? Or is
it a destructive terror to which heads of state no longer will resort even
in extremis? These are some of the questions raised by the presence of
nuclear weapons in modern war.
Almost since the beginning of this century, the American military
professional has regarded war with the same outlook as that of General
Douglas MacArthur when he said:
The general definition which for many decades has been accepted was that
war was the ultimate process of politics; that when all other political means
failed, you then go to force; and when you do that, the balance of control,
the balance of concept, the main interest involved, the minute you reach the
killing stage, is the control of the military. . . . You have got to trust at that
stage of the game when politics fails, and the military takes over, you must
trust the military, or otherwise you will have the system that the Soviet once
employed of the political commissar, who could run the military as well as
the politics of the country.

Total war, resulting from a total failure of the political processes
between states, traditionally has meant total involvement of the military
in the conduct of the war, with the ultimate goal total victory. Again
General MacArthur, this time speaking of victory, said:
Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in
war there is no substitute for victory, that if you [the military professional]
lose, the Nation will be destroyed. . . .
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The author of these classical, traditionally military words was the first
victim of the fact that war’s nature had changed with the introduction
of nuclear weapons. Political reluctance to precipitate national disaster
in nuclear war, among other considerations, limited the geography,
weapons, and operations, and changed the goals of the war in Korea,
not once, but several times in the course of the conflict.
Total war had clear goals—total victory, destruction of the enemy,
the appeal of a crusade; all under military control for military ends.
Virtually all the forces which have motivated modern democracies in
war have tended to sublimate political aims of the conflict to the military
goals of destroying the enemy.
The war that General MacArthur fought in Korea on the other hand,
had other aims, less total, without the appeal of a crusade, changing as
the military situation developed. Furthermore, that war was terminated
inconclusively. Out of the Korean experience, however, came the idea
that war indeed could be limited, that it no longer had to be total in
the traditional sense. With that realization, some deep-rooted prejudices
were swept away.
Scarcely had the new character of war become apparent, when the
nature of war began to change once again. Insurrectionary violence
emerged as the dominant characteristic of conflict. Wars no longer were
fought between states, but within states. Wars between governments
became wars inside governments, inspired by insurrectionary
movements, cliques, parties, and other groups seeking power. These
wars were characterized by a breakdown of the controls of public
administration, outlawism, banditry, terror and assassination, against
which full scale military action was required to achieve control of a
country.
This new kind of war in a sense is total, but in a completely
different sense than before. The war in Indochina virtually was total
to Indochina. The war in Algeria was total to that country—total in
resources, population, and involvement of every facet of the community.
Insurrectionary war, in many respects, is war for the minds of men, war
for control or the organs of local government and administration; a war
of public administration where votes are cast with rifles.
This changing nature of war tugs at the roots of military
professionalism. When war still was thought to be total in the nuclear
sense, dependence on long range bombers and missiles as the primary
instruments of war upset the very basis of traditional military training,
and brought into question the ultimate usefulness of military forces other
than the nuclear delivery forces. Before World War II, the maneuvers
of the destroyer squadron, the armored regiment, and the aircraft wing
credibly could be translated into combat operations. Target practice,
bombing, and fleet maneuvers developed skills whose mastery spelled
victory or defeat in battle. In the total war of the nuclear exchange,
however, an air of unreality and lack of convictions has surrounded
the bomber alert force, and the missile silo crew. They know that their
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weapons will never be used unless the entire political and military
structure of the country has failed in its task.
Korea denied the validity of the great nuclear threat as a lever
in conflicts between states where objectives, goals, and the scope of
military action could be limited, without total destruction on both sides,
and where truly vital national interests (survival) were not at stake. The
role of conventional armed forces in modern war of this kind thus
was confirmed.
In the late 1950s, however, a new concept was introduced. A policy
decision was made that conventional forces would be equally capable
of conventional and nuclear war and that they would be equipped with
small yield nuclear weapons; thus the professional dilemma brought on by
the nuclear weapon reappeared, Training and readiness for conventional
war fully were within the ken of the military profession, but what tactics
and techniques would be required by a nuclear war that was designed
to be less than total in the traditional sense? How was such a war to be
fought? If there was doubt that nuclear weapons of any kind would ever
be used at all, was the requirement for dually capable forces debilitating
conventional strength to achieve an unnecessary duality?
The changing nature of war, from total to limited, back to total in
a completely different sense, all under the shadow of a nuclear threat
that might never materialize, has brought considerable confusion to the
professional viewpoint of what war is supposed to be about.

Changing Concepts of Victory

Total war, in the American tradition, was a military war for military
ends. In the early years of the cold war, however, came a dawning
realization by the American military profession of the inseparability of
political aims from military action, General Omar N. Bradley reflected
this changing awareness when he wrote:
The American Army has also acquired a political maturity it sorely lacked
at the outbreak of World War II. At times during that war we forgot that
wars are fought for the resolution of political conflicts, and in the ground
campaign for Europe we sometimes overlooked political considerations of
vast importance. Today, after several years of cold war, we are intensely
aware that military effort cannot be separated from political objectives.

From a recognition that the nature of the ultimate end of war itself
had changed, came changing concepts of victory. If war was no longer
total, if its goal no longer was to be the annihilation of the enemy, what
then was the meaning of victory? Out of the Korean experience came
certain knowledge that winning a war no longer includes traditional
patterns of clear-cut goals, defeat of the enemy, surrender, and final
victory. The nuclear weapon was the prime contributor to this change.
The rise of insurrectionary war as the modern form of total war
further confuses the issues of war’s aims, and the ultimate meaning of
victory. At the outset the existence of insurrection suggests political
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failure, for if the organs of political control are effective, insurrection
is unlikely to begin. Containment of insurrectionary war within the
bounds of one country only serves to add to the confusion. How does
the American military fight wars to restore political stability in someone
else’s country? If the ultimate goal of the American military is the
defense of the American state, what are the goals of American military
action in insurrectionary wars in other states?
Paradoxically, the American liberal society, long suspicious of
standing armies and the use of military force, has been quick to call on
the military establishment as an instrument of foreign policy to support a national strategy that is designed to contain communism. The
acceptance of this mission has required the military establishment to
become involved in special force structures, special schooling activities,
and above all in operations aimed at achieving governmental stability
in countries that have widely differing social, cultural, economic, and
military value judgments.
The broader challenge is one to liberal society itself, as it struggles
to define more clearly its traditionally ambiguous goals. The ambiguity
in overall goals makes the military task even more difficult. The military
professional, face to face with a real problem in the field, indeed is in a
dilemma. Any kind of victory is difficult to achieve when the criteria for
winning are ambiguous.
As the pattern of insurrectionary war has developed, it increasingly
has become obvious that to be able to wage a war for stability in
public administration the military requires new skills—skills that are
commensurate with these new responsibilities. These skills must reflect
the blending of the political-economic-social-military characteristic of
insurrectionary action. The achievement of objectives in these areas is
a task that liberal democracy heretofore has been reluctant to entrust to
its military forces. Now, however, it demands that the military forces
become involved, and that they win.
A similar development occurred in France. Ambiguity of national
goals, and deep involvement of the military in the non-military demands
of insurrectionary war, led to a deep schism between the French
military and the French state during the Indochinese and Algerian
campaigns. Ultimately, this ambiguity spelled the downfall of the
French military profession, which lacking clear definition of what was
to be won, pursued political, social, psychological, and cultural aims in
the context of the totality of the new war. Eventually, so they felt, the
French military came to see national goals and what was to be won more
clearly than the vacillating French government. The military appealed to
the nation over the government, and lost the appeal. While there were
a great many dissimilarities between the French and American military
professions, thus making it difficult to contemplate the occurrence of a like
situation in American democracy, the French experience highlights the
dangers of ambiguous goals and aims, especially in insurrectionary war.
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Changing Patterns of Strategy and Tactics

When it became certain that nuclear weapons threatened national
survival, the scientific and academic communities quickly became
interested in strategy and tactics for nuclear weapons, and in national
policy consideration surrounding their employment. Arthur Herzog,
a writer on military subjects, quotes an estimate that over 100,000
pieces of literature have been written on the subject of strategy since
the end of World War II. Some of these writings have had a significant
influence on the conduct of national affairs. Indeed, a study by Raymond
L. Wilson, Jr. concludes that a small group of civilian intellectuals
significantly influenced virtually all national defense policy decisions of
the Kennedy Administration.
As might be expected, strategies proposed in these writings reflect
a wide divergence of absolute opinion from pacifism and disarmament
to preemptive war. They also reflect increased difficulty in separating
national strategy from military strategy, and demonstrate that many
segments of society, other than military, have become involved in a
field formerly considered to be exclusively military. While the military
may view civilian intrusion with alarm, the civilian looks upon
military involvement in national policymaking with equal suspicion.
Nevertheless, in terms of its size, cost, and its interrelation with almost
every aspect of public affairs, the American military establishment now
is in an unprecedented peacetime situation. It inextricably is involved in
contributing to policymaking for the nation.
Liberal society clearly recognizes the new position and influence of
the military. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., one of liberalism’s most articulate
spokesmen, expressed civilian reaction in this fashion:
We are very much aware of an increased military influence in our national
life. . . . The novelty today lies not in having professional generals venture
forth as free lances in political campaigns, but in having them as established
authorities on policy, accepted in the highest national councils and held
accountable in the most solemn national debates. . . . But in quantity and
quality, the power and prestige of the generals constitute a new phenomenon.
We have among us today, in short, a new political elite, whose future is likely
to have a considerable effect on the future of the republic.

Size, capabilities, and deployment of the nation’s military forces also
have become day-by-day concerns of the diplomat; a fact that is causing
the diplomat and the military to draw closer together. The political
liberal, however, sees military participation in the shaping of national
policy as inimical to the American political tradition. From this feeling
flows a further question as to the competence of the military man in the
broader aspects of political and military policy. What of the military’s
traditional, conservative, rigid “military mind”? Can it adapt to the
less precise parameters of political-military decisionmaking? Again
Schlesinger provides a clear expression of the civilian concern:
The quality of the military mind is hard to define. But it clearly has an
extraordinary innocence. It approaches every question as if no one else had
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ever tackled it before; it seeks to subdue every problem with military logic;
it has no reserves of overtone or undertone. The answer to everything . . . is
to estimate a situation and then take action. Everything is seen too clearly;
and the complexities of history fall by the wayside. Above all, the military
approach has trouble with the problem of ultimate goals; for life is something
more than set problems in strategy. Under conditions of total war, the
defense of the United States implies a whole series of value judgments on
questions of economics, policy, and morality.

Aside from the concern of liberal society, Schlesinger’s words
highlight a concomitant problem for the military professional. Military
science is a discipline in which skill is acquired by training and experience;
its execution demands a decisiveness of action that is not required in any
other discipline. The military professional usually is faced with a task
that somehow has to be accomplished. To do it, he relies on a fairly reflex
set of reasoned responses which, if not intellectually the best, quite often
pragmatically are correct. There is no time to ponder abstractions at
length in the fashion of the intellectual. Practical insistence on problem
solution, to which Schlesinger refers, was born of necessity, not of
intellectual poverty.
When he becomes involved in formulation of state policy, the military
professional faces a whole new set of values which in a sense erode his
conviction of the correctness of his military point of view. Huntington
avers that “politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and
the participation of military officers in politics undermines their
professionalism.” On the other hand, the real world about him has
involved the military professional in just that sort of activity, and from
it he cannot remain aloof. In the field, he is exposed to economic and
social problems in a way best expressed by Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., in these words:
The military [mind] today . . . has to be able to think in terms of training
missions the world over, a more complicated problem than is faced by any
other profession because he may be training at one time in South America,
at another time in the Far East, and at still another in Africa or in Europe.
He [the military professional] has got to know more than most economists
in terms of international economics, and he must know village politics, and
he must know the history of regions, theology of peoples, what motivates
them, what they think about; he must know what they want to be so that he
can help them. . . .

And in a broader view of the same problem President Kennedy
charged the military profession in these terms:
You [military professionals] must know something about strategy and
tactics and logic . . . economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You
must know everything you can about military power, and you must also
understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of
the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been solved
by military power alone. . . . You must be more than servants of national
policy, you must be prepared to play a constructive role in the development
of national policy, a policy which protects our interests and our society and
the peace of the world.
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Thus, the civilian intrudes into a field once considered purely
military, and the military professional is called in to sit in councils that
are debating social, economic, and political issues. This innovation
forces him to develop a new depth and breadth of perception about
his profession, his traditions, and his nation. Finally, in his new role of
economic, social, political, and military adviser at levels from the seat
of government to the primitive village, the professional must seek new
strategies, new tactics, and new doctrines to meet the conditions that he
finds in each place.

The Road Ahead

Is the American military professional ethic that was developed in
the late nineteenth century out of date for the last half of the twentieth?
Fundamental as it was, reflecting a long period of thought and
introspection, the American pre-nuclear military ethic probably was as
useful and valid in 1945 as it was in 1914 on the eve of World War I. From
nuclear weapons to the management of defense, however, science and
technology in recent years have generated conditions which challenge
the traditional role of the military in American society.
On the other hand, whatever its shortcomings may have been, the
traditional military code still meets two essential requirements: first,
it provides the rationale and disciplines for successful combat with an
enemy on the field of battle; second, its underlying sense of devotion
to a cause provides the motivation for men to seek and remain with
the profession in the absence of traditional total war, performing often
odious and increasingly hazardous tasks often for only token reward. If
we are to construct a new philosophy—an ethic for the future, it must
continue to meet these two requirements.
The traditional essence of military competence is leadership of men
in battle. In the past, leadership by and large has been uni-service. Its
development has been based on the idea that clearly defined objectives
will be specified by a superior command. Its action programs—doctrine
and tactics—have been oriented to military goals. It has been the product
of extensive military education and training, and it has been directed
by an organizational structure designed to tie the whole together in
meaningful combat.
The essential character of modern war, however, seems quite
different. First, it tends to be more and more joint in organization,
deployment, staff, and command. Second, it embodies more
comprehensive and centralized direction from the top; limiting,
shaping, and even directing action in the field. Third, it embraces new
leadership patterns, requiring greater technical-managerial competence
on the one hand, yet demanding retention of traditional values on the
other. Fourth, it increasingly is affected by decisionmaking and analysis
techniques that question the utility of traditional staff processes, even
of the staff system itself. Finally, it requires a new breadth and depth of
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understanding and ability in a far broader group of skills—economic,
social, political, military, from the Pentagon to the hamlet.
To achieve these skills, the military education system again must
be summoned to broaden the base of joint knowledge and to expand
the academic programs of the service and joint schools. The education
system also must be looked to for interagency orientation. It must
broaden the corporate sense of the military to include identification with
other agencies that are seeking common goals in their implementation
of the nation’s policies. Education must provide a clearer understanding
of management and leadership techniques in industry, in science, in
business, and in battle. Finally, both education and organization must set
to work to provide the strategy, the tactics, and the doctrine by means of
which the military profession successfully can seek the nation’s changing
goals. If there are suitable substitutes for winning in modern war, these
must be identified early, and communicated clearly to those who face
the crucial task of deciding what the job is, how to go about it, and when
the job is to be done.

Essentiality of the Military

The United States military profession is a product of the liberal
society that it serves. Coming from the liberal social system of the
democracy, changing in attitude as social attitudes in society change, the
military professional reflects his background in the nation’s education
systems, as well as his professional military education and training.
The military professional often sees himself in the Hamiltonian
heritage of nationalism; he has a strong sense of duty, bravery, and
purposeful action for his nation. Traditionally, he regrets that these
cherished values seem to have become obscured, and longs for their
return. But he cannot restore them, he cannot revive them, he cannot
win society to their call. For if he does, he has grown out of his role of
service to the state, and may cease to exist.
Nonetheless, the professional military man, and even his traditional
attitudes, are a necessary ingredient in American society, His is the
voice of caution in the winds of idealistic international argument; the
reminder that although domestically creative, the liberal tradition has
a poor record in foreign policy and national security matters. His is
the voice reminding the nation that wars are fought by people for the
control of people; that men afoot, men on and in the sea, men aloft are
the essential strength of the nation’s security. Above all, in this time of
crisis, he must strive to understand to be understood. Again and again
he must reconsider what it is that makes him and his profession distinctly
military; what he has that others have not. For only by so doing can he
come to a deeper appreciation of the unique contribution that he and his
profession can make to America, and ultimately to all mankind.
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Small Wars, Big Data:
The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict
By Eli Berman, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro with
Vestal McIntyre
Reviewed by Dr. Emile Simpson, research fellow, Harvard, Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs

T

he authors of Small Wars, Big Data combine a social science approach
to the study of asymmetric conflict with the use of large bodies of
empirical data—big data—to provide a series of practical operationallevel recommendations for would-be counterinsurgents.
On the back cover, Anne-Marie Slaughter tells us this approach
“heralds a revolution in conflict studies, one that finally brings
development, defense, and diplomacy together at the operational level.”
Unless one takes the term revolution in its literal rather than colloquial
sense, this assertion is ahistorical, oblivious to the fact that a data-driven
social science approach to conflict, which evaluated not only military but
civilian activity in a series of metrics, was used extensively by Robert S.
McNamara’s Pentagon during the Vietnam War.
While the authors acknowledge Vietnam was an “obvious failure,
one that has often been used to discredit the idea of quantitative
metrics for conflict,” their argument is that this approach has value in
asymmetric wars today (324). Do they succeed in making this case? To
my mind, on their own terms, they do; but it is important to understand
what those terms are.
Their argument runs like this. In symmetrical war, the struggle is
primarily over territory, whereas in asymmetric war, the struggle is over
people. Insofar as these conflicts are fundamentally about governing
territory, not just holding it, asymmetric conflicts are information-centric
insofar as the goal of the government and the rebel party is to gain the
support of the civilian population, which in turn requires information
from and about the civilian population.
From this premise, the book runs through a series of aspects of
counterinsurgency operations, which are analyzed from a social science
point of view, by testing propositions against large data sets. The key
findings are
•• making it safer for civilians to share information—for example by
extending cell phone coverage—leads to less violence;
•• projects to gain the support of the civilian population should be
modest in size, secure, and conditional on behavioral change from
both the population and government;
•• security and small-scale aid projects complement one another in terms
of reducing violence, in conjunction with efforts to reduce civilian
casualties; and
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•• increasing economic activity in such warzones can just as well stoke
predatory violence as alleviate deprivation by increasing incomes.
A reader may retort that some of these findings are intuitive, which
negates the need to prove them scientifically. But that attitude would
miss the point that if some of these findings are common sense (for
example, if you cause civilian casualties, you create new insurgents), they
took a long time to become common practice. In both Afghanistan and
Iraq, had such lessons been heeded from the outset, large insurgencies
might have been avoided. In this respect, the authors have performed
a valuable service in providing masses of objective, empirical data that
supports the validity of some of the doctrinal innovations in recent US
counterinsurgency doctrine.
Of course, one must equally note the authors’ arguments are limited
to their own terms, which is essentially operational-level counterinsurgency doctrine. That is to say, the authors frequently emphasize their
project is to identify “what works,” which naturally discounts the
particularities of individual conflicts and may vary substantially at the
strategic and policy level. Thus, one may successfully reduce violence,
as the 2007–08 surge did in Iraq, but nonetheless leave the country
at the mercy of Shia militia, and increase the power of Iran in Iraq.
Does this mean that counterinsurgency in Iraq worked? It’s a question
of perspective.
Ultimately, the need to account for the fact that there is a hierarchy
of perspectives through which to analyze asymmetric conflict addresses
the points of difference in the well-known and well-trodden debate over
counterinsurgency doctrine in the past decade. The critics of counterinsurgency doctrine claim it does not solve the problem, and that may
well be true at the strategic level. Conversely, any situation in which
counterinsurgency doctrine is needed in the first place is likely to be
one in which there has been a very fundamental political breakdown
in the society in question, which has produced the insurgency. In this
context, counterinsurgency is best understood as a combat dressing to
stop catastrophic bleeding, not a form of plastic surgery that, through
“nation building,” produces a new society in the West’s image.
This seems to me to be where the authors are coming from. They
all have extensive experience in the field as practitioners, are offering
hard-earned lessons to other practitioners who face insurgencies, and
are likely fully aware that counterinsurgency as an operational approach
may deal only with some branches of the problem of an insurgency. For
the roots of all insurgencies are political, and countering them requires
a political strategy into which operational doctrine can fit.
Without such a political strategy, you have Vietnam: the focus on
operational success without a theory of victory.
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Like War
Hybrid Conflicts and Information Warfare:
New Labels, Old Politics
Edited by Ofer Fridman, Vitaly Kabernik, and James C. Pearce
Reviewed by Dr. Alma Keshavarz, associate, Small Wars Journal—El Centro

T

his book is a compilation of essays written by Western and Russian
scholars on the nature of hybrid war and information warfare. The
dynamic makes for an interesting read as the authors provide analysis
through the prism of either a Western or a Russian scholar. The book is
strategically organized into three sections with two chapters by Western
authors, two by Russian authors, and a chapter by James C. Pearce.
The chapters focus on the changing nature of warfare, particularly
information warfare and hybrid war. Russia and the Islamic State are used
essentially as case studies to demonstrate the importance of hybridity
and information warfare in today’s conflicts. A number of authors in
the book, beginning with David Betz, build from Frank Hoffman’s
definition of hybrid war as a mixture of conventional, irregular,
terrorism, and criminality. Therefore, hybridity is the convergence of
various modes of warfare.
For Russian scholar Georgy Filimonov, hybrid warfare “describes a
situation where an external controlling power brings the protest-potential
masses . . . and different types of destructive opposition forces . . . to
the forefront of the fight against adversary political regimes” (25). He
applies his theory to academic, professional, and military perceptions
of the Color revolutions, and argues Russia perceives hybrid warfare
differently. Western nations view hybrid warfare as part of “intelligence”
in warfighting that incorporates irregular tactics, special operations
forces, cyber, political, and economic spheres as well as popular protests
(28). For Filimonov, hybrid warfare “blurs the line between war and
peace by intentionally destabilizing not only individual states, but also
entire regions, without a clear declaration of war” (32).
Another Russian scholar, Vitaly Kabernik, distinguishes between
war and warfare by Russian military thinking and uses three cases to
show the stages of hybridity, and the lessons learned by the Russian
military: the partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War, the
Soviet engagement in Afghanistan, and the Chechen conflicts.
The second part of the book addresses the role of social media
in information warfare and hybrid war. The authors analyze how new
technologies allow groups to take advantage of large-scale information
dissemination. Matthew Armstrong resurrects the idea of the US
Information Agency. He explains the organization was a “tool of
information warfare while the Russians waged political warfare across
nonmilitary fronts” that can be valuable today (114). Russian scholar
Radomir Bolgov examines legal and doctrinal framework of information
warfare policy and various other Russian-state policies.
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The final part of the book strictly discusses information warfare
by the Islamic State. Charlie Winter opens the section with an analysis
of official Islamic State propaganda published between October 16,
2016, and January 24, 2017. He specifically examines the opening and
the completion of the campaign to recapture east Mosul. The brief
address of various social network outlets used by the Islamic State
also offers details into the types of propaganda that was spread across
international borders.
The Islamic State’s military capability and tactics are also addressed
throughout this final section to establish how the group utilized
information warfare to conduct hybrid war and to pursue individuals in
the North Caucasus. By 2015, the group declared the area a province and
conducted four terrorist attacks in Dagestan by early 2016.
The Islamic State’s media enterprise is important to this section,
and to the whole book, as the authors develop a case study showing
the growing importance of the information space. Interestingly,
Russian language ranks third, behind Arabic and English, in Islamic
State propaganda efforts. Craig Whiteside includes the history of the
Islamic State from the forming of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s group, to the
aftermath of his death, and the Caliphate’s expansion between 2011 and
2014. Whiteside discusses major media organizations, such as the Amaq
News Agency, al-Naba, and the Al-Hayat Media Center, and provides
valuable data on the group’s media output.
The book concludes as James C. Pearce revisits the preceding
chapters and provides further analysis on the significance of hybrid
wars. Ultimately, the definitions of hybridity are “multidimensional
and integrate many different aspects of fighting into a single domain”
that perpetuate confusion and inhibit states from combating this form
of warfare (250). As Pearce notes, “Labels matter, but the contents of
conflicts and warfare have been overlooked as a result” (254). Overall,
this book is a great read for those interested in information warfare. But
as the concept of hybrid warfare continues to emerge across military,
academic, and professional settings in the West and Russia, this book
importantly distinguishes the various perspectives.

Messing with the Enemy: Surviving in a Social Media World
of Hackers, Terrorists, Russians, and Fake News
By Clint Watts
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

New York: HarperCollins,
2018
304 pages
$28.00

M

essing with the Enemy details the growing power of social media as
an informational medium that can be manipulated by both state
and nonstate groups for illicit purposes, as a form of conflict, and even
in order to engage in indirect warfare. This book should be considered
more of a practitioner work than an academic or theoretically focused
one. The author, Clint Watts, has an applied background as a former
Army officer, an FBI special agent, and an independent consultant—with
later affiliations including the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
TOC
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as well as the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division and National Security
Branch. He is presently associated with the Foreign Policy Research
Institute and George Washington University.
The work is greatly influenced by his operational experience and
contrary nature—one marked by a red-teamer’s creativity, an inability at
times to play nice institutionally, and a disdain for bureaucratic protocols
as it relates to threat group social media manipulation, resulting in a
kind of mind-hacking (that is, twenty-first century social media based
psychological operations) (16). As a result, the book benefits from
the discussions and injects related to his unique career experiences.
Nevertheless, a tension exists between the insights gained from his
real-world counterviolent extremism and counter-Russian propaganda
activities and his personal (and family) experiences, that seem out of
place at times (243–46).
The work is divided into ten chapters. No index, acronyms, or terms
section are provided. The first seven chapters focus on examples and
case studies related to the book’s topical focus. Chapter one provides
vignettes of the author’s social media capers as an al-Shabaab operative
and West Pointer cadet, chapters two and three focus on Islamic State
and al-Shabaab social media use, and chapter four looks at the troll
phenomenon, with an emphasis on the rise of Russian trolls. Chapter
five provides short accounts of WikiLeaks, the Harmony database
(a counterterrorism informational depository program), and cartel
tracking blogs in Mexico as they relate to information leakages, fusion,
and informal online news sources.
The sixth and seventh chapters look at Russian meddling in the
2016 US presidential elections and then provide an after-action analysis
of this incident which portrays how social media has become more
important as a new source for the American public than mainstream
media respectively (155).
The eighth chapter looks at the America’s lackluster counternarrative
and counterinfluence attempts and how our twentieth century
bureaucratic approach is ill-suited to the more networked challenges
facing us with a few exceptions such as West Point’s Combating
Terrorism Center’s Militant Ideolog y Atlas. The ninth chapter is the most
important—providing a theoretical framework building upon constructs
related to long-tailed, preference bubbles, social inception, and other
socio-psychological and business elements—but comes late in the text.
The tenth chapter provides some general guidance concerning
how democracies, corporations, and citizens can survive in a world
dominated by social media’s dark underside of fake news, troll farms,
botnets, and propaganda campaigns (both foreign and domestic in
origin). Components of the work that stand out are its recognition that
social media
•• allows our citizens—spurred on by Russian active measures—to align
themselves within virtual and physical “preference bubbles” to create
deep divisions in our society;
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•• empowers authoritarian states, corporations, and aspiring despots to
social engineer populaces into believing their hidden policies are in
actuality their own preferences; and
•• turns machine learning/artificial intelligence into the nuclear weapons
of information (such as social media) warfare (214, 230–31, 232–33).
In summation, Messing with the Enemy gets high marks for its
readability, its insider perspective on the nefarious side of social media,
and for helping us to better understand our opponents’ use of it against
us but lower ones for its strategic treatment of this subject matter. The
author’s discussion of both his own and others use of tradecraft—such
as rationalize, projection, minimize and ideological subversion—is also
fascinating (67, 227). The book is also well priced. It would benefit,
however, from both the inclusion of an index and a combined glossary
and acronym listing. At the War College and National Defense
University level, this work would not be considered appropriate as a
primary course text given its more operational and at times subjective
approach, but it should be used as a support to one such as LikeWar
(Singer and Brooking, 2018) or an equivalent work. I could, however,
readily see its use at the Command and Staff College and Academy level
and for individual professional military reading.

Like War: The Weaponization of Social Media
By P. W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

L
Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt, 2018
416 pages
$28.00

ike War—written by P. W. Singer, a senior fellow at the New America
foundation and author of Wired for War (2009) and Ghost Fleet (2015),
and Emerson T. Brooking, an expert on conflict and social media—is
an intellectual tour de force focusing, as its subtitle states, on the
weaponization of social media. The book, which addresses the blurring
of war, technology, and politics, advocates the perspective that conflict
in the real world and the virtual world are increasingly overlapping and
influencing one another. In essence, “Just as the internet has reshaped
war, war is now radically reshaping the internet” (19). A basic thesis of
the work is grounded in David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla’s early work
Networks and Netwars (RAND Corporation, 2001, 182–83):
These new wars are not won by missiles and bombs, but by those able to
shape the story lines that frame our understanding, to provoke the responses
that impel us to action, to connect with us to at the most personal level, to
build a sense of fellowship, and to organize to do it all on a global scale,
again and again (Singer and Brooking, 21).

This work builds upon these core principles:
•• First, the internet has left adolescence.
•• Second, the internet has become a battlefield.
•• Third, this battlefield changes how conflicts are fought.
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•• Fourth, this battle changes what “war” means.
•• Fifth, and finally, we’re all part of this war. (21–22)
The book is divided into nine chapters. The thematic foci are (1)
introductory remarks concerning Like War; (2) internet context as a
disruptive technology; (3) social media and information proliferation
as a double-edged sword (truth transparency and fake truths);
(4) authoritarian regime use of censorship and disinformation, (5) fake
truths and the botnets to spread them; (6) Like War combatants (ISIS
and Hollywood entrepreneurs) and attributes (emotion, authenticity,
community, and digital flooding); (7) Like War components and
description; (8) digital freedom, censorship, social media companies,
neural networks, and artificial intelligence (AI); and (9) a conclusion
with Like War rules and liberal democratic response suggestions. The
work’s notes are extensive (107 pages), though sentence fragment linked
rather than numeric based, and the index (20 pages) is well developed.
Some of the book’s components include short discussions about the
#Pizzagate conspiracy meme in which enslaved children were said to
be held in a sex dungeon under a pizza restaurant tied to a presidential
campaign, the infamous Pepe the Frog meme used in a political
campaign and by racists, and the initial concept of “digital serfs”—that
is, early AOL dial-up modem volunteers who received cut-rate or even
no-charge internet access for providing the company free labor.
Given the importance of the Like War construct, the rules isolated
by the authors are listed below:
•• First, for all the sense of flux, the modern information environment
is becoming stable.
•• Second, the internet is a battlefield.
•• Third, this battlefield changes how we must think about
information itself.
•• Fourth, war and politics have never been so intertwined.
•• Fifth, we’re all part of the battle. (261–62)
Likewise, the more important points that need to be addressed are
as follows:
•• For governments, the first and most important step is to take this new
battleground seriously.
•• Today, a significant part of American political culture is willfully
denying the new threats to its cohesion. In some cases, it’s colluding
with them.
•• Accordingly, information literacy is no longer merely an education
issue but a national security imperative. When someone engages in
the spread of lies, hate, and other societal poisons, they should be
stigmatized accordingly.
•• Those who deliberately facilitate enemy efforts, whether it be
providing a megaphone for terrorist groups or consciously spreading
disinformation, especially that from foreign government offensives,
have to be seen for what they are. (261–66)
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From a social media analytical perspective, the work focuses
primarily on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Myspace is rightfully
treated in its legacy capacity with Instagram, Reddit, WeChat (Chinese),
and WhatsApp also getting varying levels of coverage. The media
outlet Breitbart is also addressed quite well in the work along with the
activities of the innovative open-source intelligence using the Bellingcat
investigative team. Even more importantly, however, the social media
brilliance of the Trump presidential campaign is described—with its Steve
Bannon and Cambridge Analytica link—reportedly allowing it big data
mining on 220 million Americans for precision vote targeting purposes.
Two items the book could benefit from would be a detailed glossary
of social media specific terms—such as “sockpuppets” (fake online
identities) and “astroturfing” (creating the appearance of grassroots
support)—and more material on the actual and projected impact of
AI and deep learning systems on social media manipulation (111, 142).
While the book has done an excellent job presenting the recent history
related to the weaponization of social media and the contemporary
environment, more analysis of neural network-trained chatbots and other
machine-driven communication tools (MADCOMs) would have been
most valuable—especially if such a deeper treatment might have yielded
additional governmental policy suggestions to combat authoritarian and
radical Islamist uses of Like War directed against the West.
Still, even with these slight demerits, I highly recommend this book
as a must-read for American strategic thinkers interested in this topical
area. The work is fair, balanced, well-researched, and well-written, and
helps to illuminate a new facet of twenty-first century warfare. This
new facet is one that, as foreign interference in the 2016 US presidential
election and subsequent disinformation campaigns directed at our
NATO allies attest, is only expected to become increasingly more
common. From this reviewer’s assessment, Like War is a more mature
expression of Netwar as, decades later, many more data points support
the contention that the internet will be, or now has been, weaponized.
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Contemporary Conflicts
Why Terrorists Quit:
The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists
By Julie Chernov Hwang
Reviewed by Dr. Audrey Kurth Cronin, School of International Service,
American University

J

ulie Chernov Hwang’s monograph seeks to understand why some
Indonesian jihadists have stopped engaging in violence, and to tease out
broader lessons that apply to terrorist disengagement in other contexts.
It is based on extensive field studies, including more than 100 interviews
with 55 jihadists who were members of seven groups operating in eight
cities. Concise, well-written, and the outcome of years of on-the-ground
research, this is not your typical dry, theoretical academic tome. It has
sharp thinking, frank expression, and excellent editing. The author has
done the hard work, and the reader benefits.
Chernov Hwang identifies four factors important to the
disengagement process. I would summarize them as group dynamics,
context, social ties, and personal development—not a particularly new
theoretical framework. But what is fresh, rich, and invaluable is the
evidence, colorful interviews, and wealth of details to explain and support
each factor. I know of no other book on Indonesian disengagement that
offers such robust research.
After a literature review, the first section fleshes out the reasons
some Indonesian jihadists have turned away. The first is disillusionment
with the group’s tactics and leaders. Chernov Hwang describes individual
jihadists repulsed by the targeting of civilians, for example, or gradually
finding their leaders misguided, weak, or astrategic.
The second is a perceived change in the threat, or in the likelihood
of achieving a group’s aims—for example, one man responded to a
reduction in incidents of Christian militias attacking Muslims. The threat
had dissipated, so his services were less needed. Another left because the
popular backlash made bombings counterproductive. ChernovHwang’s
evidence seems to indicate, in Indonesia at least, good local governance
can change jihadists’ perspectives and behaviors. Jihadists’ unwavering
commitment to ideology is nowhere to be found in this book.
Building non-jihadist human connections is the third factor. The
most important tie the author finds is new friendships, including with
former antagonists (57). She relates a poignant story of an imprisoned
jihadist who befriended Daniel, the only Christian in the prison, began to
realize he was not evil, and turned away from his group leaders’ teachings.
Lastly, Chernov Hwang finds former Indonesian jihadists often seek
a more normal life, wanting to marry, get a job, and start a family. As
soldiers do, jihadists bond with one another. Sometimes that brotherhood
is what keeps them fighting. The author finds a key element in successful
disengagement is building even stronger bonds with friends, business
associates, and family, to displace former comrades.
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It is refreshing to read a terrorism book describing an optimistic
pathway out of violence. The meat of it—the middle four of the eight
chapters—traces individual stories of specific operatives. Here many
interesting tidbits are offered. A jihadist named Anas, for example,
shared: “I became addicted to it. We have to be aware that jihad is
addictive. Some people say that violence is like opium” (82). Case studies
of “B.R.” (who served time for killing a prosecutor, was released, and
rejoined his old guitar band), Ali Imron (who is still in prison), and Ali
Fauzi (who was influenced by a workshop bringing terrorists and their
victims together) follow next.
Illustrating that some jihadists are irreconcilables, the final story is
about “Yuda,” who is still committed to violence. Twenty-two members
of Yuda’s family were killed in the Walisongo school massacre of 2000,
where Christian militia members slaughtered at least 165 Muslim
civilians. Between 2004 and 2006, Yuda bombed churches, mutilated
schoolgirls, and personally executed a priest. The police killed his
brothers, and unlike the others, Yuda’s family did not pressure him to
quit. After his capture, Yuda said the police had tortured him. Yuda is
driven by his desire for vengeance, particularly against the Indonesian
police and security forces.
The book concludes with an analysis of the actions of the Indonesian
government, civil society groups, and already disengaged individuals,
and this is where the pay dirt for policymakers is. Chernov Hwang
points to a lack of funding and data collection on the part of government
programs, which have had limited success as a result. She contends
the highly publicized activities of Densus 88 (the Indonesian police
counterterrorism team founded in 2003), initiated in the aftermath
of the 2002 Bali bombing, were better at gathering intelligence than
reintegrating jihadists into society (145). Local government efforts
to provide job training and funds for business start-ups were too
small-scale, she argues. In July 2010, the government established the
Indonesian National Counter-Terrorism Bureau; but again, the author
argues, disengagement and aftercare were underfunded.
Chernov Hwang is more complimentary of the efforts of disengaged
jihadists to help fellow jihadists leave and the work by private groups,
such as Search for Common Ground and the Institute for International
Peace Building, that supports a small number of former jihadists but
follows them very closely over many years. Elements of success for
all of the civil society programs, the author argues, include in-depth
research on the participants, long-term trust building, individual
needs assessments, a focus on professional development, and hands-on
learning instead of top-down lecturing. Above all, she advises staying
away from “ideological hot-button topics,” which is exactly what the
Saudi deradicalization program emphasizes.
No book is perfect, and this one could have dug deeper in its
analysis. An assessment of the level of resources required for these
recommendations would have added heft. Robust aftercare is a
wonderful idea but expensive and labor-intensive. It seems unfair to
speculate about what a great government program would look like based
on small, highly tailored civil society initiatives that might be hard to
scale up. I do not know: I wonder what Chernov Hwang thinks. I would
have welcomed a recognition that state resources are constrained, plus
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an awareness of the broad choices and trade-offs government officials,
unlike nongovernmental organizations, must always make.
This book makes an excellent contribution to the study of
counterterrorism by providing an in-depth case study of how Indonesian
terrorists give up violence. Senior members of the defense community
will find it well worth their time.

Our Latest, Longest War:
Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan
Edited by Aaron B. O’Connell
Reviewed by COL James W. Bogart, board member, Army Review Boards Agency

T

his cautionary tale illuminates the contributing factors of both
disregarding culture and eschewing the idea of nation building that
have led to failure during 13 years of combat operations in Afghanistan.
As the US defense strategy prepares to shift from cultural engagements
to preparations for large-scale combat against competitors such as
Russia and China, lessons from Afghanistan necessitate consideration
for cultural planning before, during, and after large-scale combat. Aaron
B. O’Connell’s anthology, Our Latest, Longest War: Losing Hearts and Minds
in Afghanistan, presents a reference for leaders at all levels to consider
for current and future operations through the use of nine case studies
that seize upon different aspects of the Afghan War, and the history of
warfare in Afghanistan in general.
Chapter one focuses on the political arenas in both the United
States and Afghanistan. Ronald E. Neumann provides his experience
as the ambassador to Afghanistan from 2005–7, an infantry officer in
Vietnam, and as a career foreign service officer the political dysfunction
of Washington that impacted outcomes in Afghanistan. Colin Jackson,
associate professor of strategy and policy at the US Naval War College
and a Reserve lieutenant colonel with deployment experience as executive
officer to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) deputy chief
of staff of operations in 2011 supports the overarching thesis in chapter
two. Jackson utilizes a five-act structure in explaining the highs and
lows of the Afghan War history from 2001 to 2014 and the cessation of
combat operations.
In chapter three, Martin Loicana, chief of the historical office at
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, and Craig C. Felker, a
retired US Navy captain and former chair of the US Naval Academy’s
history department, focus on the reasons for failures in training the
Afghan National Security Forces throughout Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan. Continuing with failures of training Afghan
forces in chapter four, former Captain Pashtoon Atif of Afghanistan
National Police in Kandahar, Afghanistan discusses the history of
training Afghan police and cultural misunderstanding of policing by
Afghans and international policing organizations.
Authors for chapter five and six, provide insight into reconstruction
and development and rule of law and governance in Afghanistan.

Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2017
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Lieutenant Commander Jamie Lynn De Coster, PhD candidate at Tufts
University, explains the failures of reconstruction and development
due to internal competition between organizations responsible for
supporting the Afghan government in chapter five. In chapter six, two
army officers with PhDs in international affairs and relations, argue
that there were three persistent problems that impacted rule of law and
governance. Colonel Abigail T. Linnington, who served as advisor to the
commander of the Rule of Law Field Force in Afghanistan, Combined
Joint Interagency Task Force 435, and Lieutenant Colonel Rebecca D.
Patterson, who served as strategic advisor to the ISAF commander from
2011 to 2012, offer their deployed and academic experience regarding
rule of law and governance.
Marine Corps Captain Aaron MacLean, managing editor for the
Washington Free Beacon, argues “certain characteristics of liberalism bear a
critical share of the blame for the most recent disaster in Afghanistan”
in chapter seven (213). Chapter eight’s author, Lieutenant Commander
Daniel R. Green, offers a success story with Special Operations Forces
building security at the local village level. Benjamin F. Jones, a retired
lieutenant colonel and dean of the College of Arts and Science at Dakota
State University, focuses on the transition of security responsibilities
from ISAF to the Afghan government and the Afghan security forces in
chapter nine. Jones’s experience as a member of the Strategic Transition
and Assessment Group from 2011 to 2012 enables the reader to follow
the difficulties in the transition process.
This book illustrates the need for senior members of the defense
community to internalize the multiple lessons about cultural biases and
misunderstanding that guide how they think and act, versus those of
allies. Acknowledging the US military will engage in future operations as
part of a coalition, leaders must know with whom they are working (at all
levels of operations) by asking how allies think and conduct themselves.
This is a lesson in cultural understanding captured at the small unit level
that requires permeating through multiple levels of command, both
military and civilian. O’Connell and the other authors provide lessons
from Afghanistan that argue for continued cultural understanding in
order to avoid cultural failures now and in the future.
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Civil-Military Relations
Four Guardians: A Principled Agent View
of American Civil-Military Relations
By Jeffrey W. Donnithorne
Reviewed by Dr. Lionel Beehner, research director, US Military Academy’s
Modern War Institute

T

he study of civil-military relations can have a hamster wheel-like
quality to it. Everyone dusts off their dog-eared copies of Huntington
whenever a civil-military crisis occurs. America does not suffer coups, so
all is hunky-dory, goes one interpretation. Yet, civil-military crises, like
trolley cars, appear with enough regularity to make scholars take notice.
Civil-military relations can be motivated by a gap between those who
serve and those who do not, by interagency turf wars, or by maintaining
the military as a professional and apolitical institution.
Regardless, there is sometimes a feeling that the debate has barely
budged since 1957, when Huntington introduced his normative theory
of how military professionalism ought to work. Discussion followed
in the decades to come, as Morris Janowitz countered that military
professionalism was inadequate; soldiers going back as far as the
Revolutionary War era were integral to the fabric of society and should not
be garrisoned from the masses. Peter Feaver, one of Huntington’s pupils,
also challenged his mentor by noting that neither military isolation nor
civilian objective control guarantees sound strategy or professionalism
given civil-military relations, at its heart, is a principal-agent conundrum
motivated by rationalist material interests. What is required of principals
(civilians), economists tell us, is greater monitoring of the agent (military),
a narrower gap in preferences, rewards for compliance, or punishment
for shirking.
Nevertheless, this interpretation is also found wanting, writes
Jeffrey W. Donnithorne. In his new book, he challenges both Feaver
and Huntington. Regarding the former, he suggests the decision by
agents to comply or shirk is not a simple binary. This theory appears
to assume that the military only executes, and not advises—although
this insight is not especially original, as Feaver and Dubik point out.
Yet, often military leaders are involved heavily in the advising stages of
a policy decision, a recipe for both friction within the armed services
and between the military and its civilian overseers. In this way, military
leaders are motivated by a shadow of the future and seek to lock in
favorable policies advantageous to their service.
This introduces new insights: if a policy is seen as lax or unenforceable,
opposition may be tepid. Or sometimes policies proposed by the
principal lack coherence, make implementation by the agent, even with
the best intentions, unfeasible. The question for military leaders is not
whether to comply, but how. This goes in spades in an environment
teeming with ambiguity. An observable implication of this theory is
that, in an operating environment against Nazis or Soviets, we should
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expect less civil-military friction. Yet in one teeming with peripheral
or peacekeeping operations, where the military is outsourced as a
constabulary force to defend against caravans of migrants, American
Indians, or Mexican banditos, we might expect civil-military relations
to be more contentious—this is not a new theory. But a variant of one
proposed by Michael Desch.
Third, and here is Donnithorne’s major contribution: there is a
yawning gap within the services when it comes to institutional biases,
norms, and desired ends, which affect compliance. The drum of each
service beats to its own idiosyncratic rhythm, and syncopating their
parochial interests can be daunting under the best of circumstances.
Political science, in its efforts to be ever parsimonious, does scholarship
a disservice by neatly assuming the military as a monolith, when in fact
there are “four guardians” with vastly different perspectives, cultures,
and institutional biases.
Donnithorne’s book is a methodological tour de force. To test his
hypotheses, he divides his model between stages on the X-axis (advising
versus executing) and policy coherence on the Y-axis (high versus low)
and draws on two cases: the execution of Presidential Directive 18 to create
the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (1977–83) and the passage of
the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
The book, however, is not without flaws both of commission and
of omission. First, at the heart this theory is that culture matters and
each of the four guardians has ingrained culture through which it filters
its civil-military relations decisions. Yet, this definition of culture feels
incomplete. The author assumes culture is fixed, yet culture is likely
endogenous to civil-military relations crises or other key events—such
as war. One wishes he had engaged with more of the literature on
military culture by Theo Farrell and Elizabeth Kier, among others. The
Pentagon may never look like Google, but we should not assume its
culture is immutable.
Second, largely absent from his analysis is politics and partisanship.
Donnithorne’s first case, the creation of what would become Central
Command, was spearheaded by young staffers in Carter’s National
Security Council unversed in military science, which may explain why
its early phase was incoherent and the process dragged on for six years.
Yet one cannot divorce this from politics. Democratic administrations
are often perceived to be less interested in the deployment of decisive
conventional force and appear to prefer to intervene for more ambiguous
ends, whether for peacekeeping (Somalia), humanitarianism (Bosnia),
or preventing a migration crisis (Haiti). Republicans, by contrast, are
motivated more by hard power and realpolitik, which lend to a blackand-white worldview and more decisive action. The military top brass
generally prefers the latter viewpoint.
Methodologically, I wish Donnithorne had selected cases that
might vary the structure of the international system. One imagines the
international system’s distribution of power influences the coherence
of policy. Maybe under conditions of, say, multipolarity, civil-military
relations is just really challenging because any policy will be seen as
lacking specificity or too challenging to execute or enforce. Both of
Donnithorne’s cases come at the waning years of the Cold War, so
TOC

Book Reviews: Civil-Military Relations

77

maybe his theory only holds explanatory purchase under conditions of
bipolarity? Also, if his theory applies to wartime conditions, another case,
perhaps Feaver’s treatment of the “surge” might be included.
What about alternative hypotheses? Maybe poor civil-military
relations has nothing to do with service culture at all. But rather the
unique attributes and oddities of the civilian and military leadership at
that moment, a point he only mentions in passing on page 213?
Finally, I struggled with the book’s title. Beyond the cheeky double
entendre and nod to Feaver, it felt like Donnithorne was essentially
implying that the services are principled, when in fact we know they are
like any other rent-seeking outfit in Washington—motivated by turf,
profits, and preserving their autonomy. How is that principled?
These are minor quibbles. Donnithorne’s chapters on the four
services should be required reading for any young cadet or midshipman,
as they nicely encapsulate their quirks. Is it not strange, Donnithorne
wonders, why West Point’s grounds are speckled with statuary to its
greatest generals—though Sylvanus Thayer, the “Father of the Military
Academy,” was a colonel, not a general—whereas the US Air Force
Academy is littered with aircraft.
Donnithorne’s book is a welcome addition to the crowded field of
civil-military relations. With more contributions like his, we may yet get
off the civil-military relations hamster wheel.
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Grand Strategy
American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump
By Hal Brands
Reviewed by Dr. J. Thomas Moriarty a professorial lecturer within the School of
International Service at American University

T
Washington, DC: Brooks
Institution Press, 2018
256 pages
$25.99

he demand for change, real, substantive change, is not in itself an
uncommon and or even unreasonable desire—especially when it
comes to American grand strategy. If we were to engage in an open and
honest evaluation of United States foreign affairs since the end of World
War II, one could easily testify to the many triumphs of United States
diplomacy while, at the same time, acknowledging the United States
diplomatic record during this time is hardly flawless. Moreover, here lies
the problem: regardless of whether you are a critic or a proponent of
United States international engagement, you will not have a hard time
massing a considerable amount of evidence to reinforce your worldview.
President Trump has made clear his desire for a new direction in US
foreign policy. His critics are no less determined to maintain our current
course. So where do we go from here? Over the years, there has been no
shortage of academics, strategists, and former government officials who
have sought to answer this question. Yet Hal Brands’s book, American
Grand Strateg y in the Age of Trump, stands out among the pack.
Brands, one of the leading authorities on American grand strategy,
is the author of several noteworthy books on the subject, including the
outstanding What Good Is Grand Strateg y? Power and Purpose in American
Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush. His latest book is actually
a compendium of essays he has published over the last few years that
seeks to provide a thorough and historically grounded appraisal of the
Trump administration’s vision of American foreign policy. It is important
to note this book’s targeted audience is advanced, well-read scholars,
and practitioners of American grand strategy; although those who are
new to this field will also find this book enjoyable and educational, the
learning curve will be high. In order to fully appreciate the nuances of
grand strategy that underlie this book, I would recommend that this not
be the first book on the subject you read.
Brands begins with a spirited defense of the globally engaged, post1945 American grand strategy and critiques a popular alternative grand
strategy known as offshore balancing. He then proceeds to examine and
unpack President Trump’s “America First” campaign rhetoric, which
Brands argues closely follows a Fortress America grand strategy that
would see the United States fundamentally reverse its commitment
to maintain the international order, pursue economic nationalism,
and forgo multilateralism in favor of unilateral engagements. Brands
provides a careful, fair, and thorough admonishment of this type of
thinking. Yet it is not Brands’ critique of the Fortress America grand
strategy that makes this book of great value; rather, it is his proposal
for a new, or more accurately, a revised grand strategy called “better
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nationalism,” which seeks to improve upon, not abandon, a globally
engaged United States grand strategy.
Brands is complimentary of the post-1945 global order the United
States helped to create. At the same time, he is not blind to the growing
populist tendencies developing within the United States and Europe. He
does not accept all of the Trump administration’s concerns, nor does he
completely reject all of them. He accepts a globally engaged American
strategy but is unafraid to pinpoint that need to be improved. Whether
Brands’s more nationalistic internationalism (partially practiced by
the Nixon and Reagan administrations), is the best strategy for the
US is debatable. What is not debatable is that the author’s approach
to critical thinking and strategy development is the clear and central
accomplishment of this book.
Brands identifies some challenges in implementing a better
nationalistic grand strategy, including upsetting allies and partial
disruption of the international order, and executing such an approach
would require extreme skill and sophistication by the United States.
Brands is no doubt correct about the challenges in attempting to execute
such a grand strategy, but he spends little time in explaining how to
overcome these challenges. If the United States failed in its attempts to
implement a better nationalistic strategy or undertook a scaled-down
version of it, the results could be even worse than any alternative grand
strategy. In short, there are consequences for failure; as such, a more
deliberate examination of the obstacles to successful implementation of
“better nationalism” represents both the main drawback of this book
and a wasted opportunity for Brands.
Nonetheless, the thoughtfulness, relevance, and contributions of
this book to the field of American grand strategy more than outweigh
any of its shortcomings. Brands’s commitment to sustained and
sophisticated scholarship is very much appreciated and welcomed. I
highly recommend this book.

The End of Grand Strategy:
US Maritime Operations in the 21st Century
By Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski
Reviewed by Dr. Sarandis Papadopoulos, Secretariat Historian, Naval History
and Heritage Command

I

n the past, the United States “did” grand strategy well. Whether
George Washington’s harmonizing of military operations and coalition
relations to gain Colonial independence, Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses
Grant’s complementary efforts to defeat the Confederacy’s will and ability
to resist, or the triumvirate of Franklin Roosevelt, George Marshall and
Ernest King administering a global war, Americans have long known
how to match ways, means, and ends. Due to the complexity of today’s
challenges, however, and the ever-present desire to control world events,
according to Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski’s The End of Grand
Strategy: US Maritime Operations in the 21st Century that ability is now gone.
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Their evidence to make that diagnosis is how current-day American naval
power satisfies US government interests.
This monograph is built upon a solid cross-section of recent literature
and government reports, leavened with interviews. Unsurprisingly, the
American navalist Alfred T. Mahan appears in the text several times,
although the Briton Julian Corbett does not. The work seeks to explain
the inability, even impossibility, of crafting an American grand strategy.
The argument in The End of Grand Strateg y showcases a tyranny:
US naval operations reflect unconstrained national wishes. Reich and
Dombrowski explain these ambitions using six case studies: maintaining
Arabian Gulf access; conducting exercises to meet an unfolding IndoPacific challenge; managing alliances or coalitions to fend off terrorists
and pirates; preventing nuclear, chemical and biological proliferation;
confronting an indeterminate Arctic end state; and stemming illicit
flows of drugs and people across the oceans and Caribbean (chapters
3–8). The tyranny is that the military is all the US government has to
address these challenges, in part reflecting then-General James Mattis’s
2013 comment to Congress, “If you don’t fund the State Department
fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately.” To the authors,
the current environment is so complex, and so demanding, every postCold War administration will commit the US Navy, Marines, and Coast
Guard, without reference to any single ways-means-ends calculus(32).
Setting strategic priorities is impossible in such a climate, given
the challenges’ multiplicity and the operational loads they impose.
Instead, all six case studies match one of three durable American
strategic approaches: a primacist slant the authors call “hegemony,”
a multilateralist role they call “sponsorship,” or a noninterventionist
“retrenchment.” Within each strategic attitude, two variants are outlined
here, yielding six strategies which have coexisted across all twenty-first
century presidencies. As the object of this book, the US sea services
consequently work in a world of plural strategies not a singular one.
Even in our state of relative peace, the services work hard and can never
win, all to declining effect and straining readiness (7). In such a light,
conceiving a grand, unified approach, World War II’s “Germany first”
or Cold War containment, is out of reach, making an effort to create one
so unworkable the authors call it “presumptuous” (161).
Such a conclusion is destined to challenge Reich and Dombrowski’s
colleagues, political economists and international relations theorists,
whom they characterize as creating strategy deductively, that is from
the top down. Instead, The End of Grand Strateg y assembles its arguments
inductively, looking at operational case studies and generalizing
divergent strategies from them. Such a method has a strong appeal to
this reviewer.
The approach here is provocative, but not prescriptive; there is no
solution offered in the book to the current American strategic waysends-means mismatch (41–42). Its case studies read well, with chapter
6, “Navigating the Proliferation Security Initiative and Informal
Sponsorship” teaching much. That segment discusses the Americaninitiated regime for controlling weapons of mass destruction using naval
power and, more importantly, the level of operational brokering each
mission requires. To the last point, the appended list of Partnership
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Security Initiative exercises is particularly welcome. An example of
ad hoc sponsorship, the Partnership Security Initiative commands
international acceptance, while oceanic geography demands much effort
by the sea services to fulfill its needs.
But there are concerns about the book’s portrait of our strategic
moment. Today’s environment is complex, but not unique in American
naval experience. Governments have always used navies to influence
events ashore. In fact, today’s strategists could compare how the 1930’s
US Navy eked out the resources to prepare for high-end challenges
during peacetime.
Similarly, The End of Grand Strateg y’s conclusion prompts discomfort,
suggesting that, if properly resourced, a hegemonic primacy “should”
become America’s grand strategy (emphasis in original, 177). In response,
the strongest question this reviewer can pose is whether a grand strategy
has a defensive end or an offensive one. Reich and Dombrowski do
not discuss whether a defensive role is the stronger strategic stance.
Using military force solely to defend America’s economy and social
well-being, as part of international good behavior, is primarily defensive.
If American seapower was cast as its “ways,” such a sponsorship tack
would broaden mission legitimacy and could lower the demand for US
naval resources. Given that deterring conflict is a central US goal, the
more combat credible friends the nation has, the more secure it will be.
To sum up, in its diagnosis The End of Grand Strateg y offers much;
scholars and the policy community need to take its argument into
account when debating strategy. Setting priorities is absolutely needed,
and current arguments are stilted. While flawed, this book starts us on
fixing that discussion.
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Rationality in the North Korean Regime:
Understanding the Kims’ Strategy of Provocation
By David W. Shin
Reviewed by Dr. Andrew Scobell, senior political scientist, RAND Corporation

T
Lanham, Maryland:
Lexington Books, 2018
354 Pages
$110.00

he regime in Pyongyang is not crazy, and Kim Jong-Un is not a
lunatic. While these assertions are articles of faith for most scholars
and analysts who study North Korea, for web surfers seeing photographs
of the chubby cartoonish leader of Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK) and casual cable news viewers watching footage of
parading Korean People’s Army soldiers goose-stepping in formation,
Kim appears a crackpot and North Korea seems a bizarre place.
Which set of perceptions is accurate? Author David Shin puts this
question to the test. The result is a scholarly volume of more than 300
pages that examines ten case studies of Pyongyang’s “provocations”
between 1950 and 2015. For each case, Shin looks to assess whether
DPRK actions were rational based upon his determination that an action
was premeditated and driven by a clear strategy. The author spends more
than a dozen pages at the outset exploring the meaning of “rationality.”
This is not wasted effort since the variable tends to be seen in strictly
dichotomous terms: someone is either rational or irrational. But as Shin
notes, rather than perpetually clear-eyed and calculating, emotions are
part and parcel of the logic of rational decision making. Moreover, the
calculus of rationality varies by decisionmaker and context.
The author asserts—quoting Keith Stanovich—“rational beliefs and
actions are supported by strategies” (2). Thus, for each case examined,
“The preponderance of the evidence must demonstrate that at least one
of the Kims and/or the core North Korean elites . . . deliberately planned
and executed the provocation” (17). In other words, a provocation is part
of a coherent strategy. But discerning intent is no simple matter in a
country without a free press, where it is not possible to interview senior
officials or conduct archival research. Shin does well to comb the range
of available evidence, most of which are secondary sources.
Shin concludes that North Korea is rational—or at least mostly
rational—in 9 out of the 10 cases he examines: 6 in the Kim Il-Sung
era (1950–94), 2 in the Kim Jong-Il era (1994–2011) and 2 Kim Jong-Un
era (2012–present). In only one case does the author detect significant
irrationality: the 1987 bombing of Korean Air Flight 858. The nine
core chapters that examine the 10 case studies are extremely dense and
detailed making it quite challenging for a reader to discern the degree
of rationality driving each provocation. Fortunately, in the concluding
chapter the author includes a helpful table that allows the reader to review
the key elements of each provocation and see where Shin comes out.
For this reviewer, one major disappointment is that the author is not
as explicit as he could be in defining who exactly constitutes the “North
Korean regime” and how best to characterize it. Shin comes closest
17 pages into his book where he explains—almost in passing—that
in each case study he assumes that the key decision-makers are Kim
Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il, Kim Jong-Un, or “core North Korean elites” (17).
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Nevertheless, the reader is never completely clear about who made every
decision to execute a provocation and what kind of regime the decisionmakers are a part of. Shin does observe on the very last page of text that
North Korea is undergoing a “post-totalitarian transition,” but he does
not specify when this transition began (292).
Shin considers some key implications of his findings and several
of these are worth noting. The good news is that since the North
Korean regime is rational, war is avoidable, Pyongyang is deterrable, and
“Washington can pursue diplomacy with realistic goals” (290). The bad
news, as Shin observes, is that the denuclearization of North Korean
may not be achievable at least in the short term. After all, why would a
rational Kim Jong-Un be eager to negotiate away his greatest asset?
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Russia
Russia’s Military Revival
By Bettina Renz
Reviewed by Dr. Andrew Monaghan, Oxford Changing Character of War Centre,
Pembroke College, Oxford

B
Cambridge: Polity, 2018
249 pages
$64.95

ettina Renz, an associate professor of politics and international
relations in Britain, has performed an important service with
Russia’s Military Revival. In a concise but thorough and wide-ranging
monograph, she offers both a succinct critique of the more alarmist
Western assessments of Russian military capability, its uses in Moscow’s
foreign policy, and a well-structured, coherent overview of Russia’s
defense capabilities. The book’s five chapters, which are supplemented
by a useful biography, present an argument built on a wide range of
academic and primary sources.
Chapter 1 sketches historical background, examining the nexus
between military power and foreign policy and four persistent factors
that shape Russian foreign policy: great-power status, sovereignty,
imperial legacy, and multilateralism. Renz underscores the point that a
strong military is an essential feature of Russia’s great-power status and
self-perception. Equally, she emphasizes the significance to Moscow of
sovereignty: the collapse of the USSR presented the Russian leadership
with a crisis of statehood. Consequently, the importance of maintaining
sovereignty has emerged as a key principle and top priority in Russian
foreign policy. She quotes President Putin: “True sovereignty for Russia
is an absolute necessity for survival” and recognizes Moscow’s need for
armed forces able to fight simultaneously in “global, regional and—if
necessary—in several local conflicts to guarantee Russian security and
territorial integrity no matter what the scenario” (31–32).
Chapter 2 also establishes a longer-term context, but it looks at
Russian military reform in more depth. Renz colorfully quotes Pavel
Grachev, then defense minister, who noted Russia inherited “nothing
more than ruins and debris” from the USSR, and elaborates the twentyyear struggle to transform the former Soviet military into a force fit for
the twenty-first century (53). It was a struggle beset by political neglect
throughout the 1990s, and one that, for all the progress since 2008,
remains incomplete, particularly in terms of manpower and the defense
industry’s ability to deliver.
The third chapter offers a descriptive review of Russia’s other force
structures, describing the Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Security
Service, the Ministry for Emergency Situations, and the recently formed
National Guard. This is an important part of the book—too few Western
analyses attempt to think of the relationship between Russia’s armed
forces and those that deal with internal order and new security challenges
for which the military is ill-equipped to deal. As Renz notes, the link
between Russia’s internal and external security is poorly understood in
the Euro-Atlantic community, not least because some of these forces
and capabilities do not fit readily into existing analytical frameworks.
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The fourth chapter looks at the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s
intervention in Syria in the longer-term context of Moscow’s use of
military power since the 1990s. Indeed, the author observes Russian
authorities have regularly used military power in pursuit of a variety
of policy objectives since the early 1990s, and the deployment of the
Russian military beyond Russia’s borders is therefore nothing new.
Moscow has used military power both to cooperate with others and to
strengthen its position in multilateral institutions.
Chapter five explores Russian military thinking. Offering a critique
of what has become known as “Russian hybrid warfare” or the mythical
“Gerasimov Doctrine,” Renz is clear: these terms are not useful, since
they have been stretched to cover all kinds of Russian behavior. Instead,
she points out that Russian military thinking often differs from that in
the West, citing, for instance, the lack of a consensus in Russia to mirror
the prevalent Western post-Cold War view that conventional wars were a
thing of the past. Russian strategic priorities differ and military thought
builds on a rich homegrown theoretical history: Soviet military theorists
produced influential and innovative work that was often well-ahead of
that being done in the West. Renz also sketches out various groups of
thought to illustrate the divergent views within the Russian military
establishment about the changing character of war, the debates over
the relationship between manpower and technology, and the kind of
conflicts likely to erupt in future.
Despite the various debates, reforms, and visible improvements,
Renz emphasises the strong sense of long-term evolutionary continuity
in Russia’s military revival, especially with regard to the importance
of large-scale conventional warfare. There is no evidence, she argues,
of a fundamental turnaround or paradigm shift in Russian views
of the utility of force this decade. Better capabilities may offer more
opportunities to use force, but do not necessarily generate a willingness
to use it in aggressive, expansionist war-making. Russia’s military
revival, she suggests, owes as much to internal insecurity and stability
as about fighting wars. Moreover, while there are clear improvements in
terms of capabilities, Renz makes it clear that Russia’s capabilities are not
yet in a position really to challenge Western and especially US military
capabilities substantially.
Historians may protest at Renz’s use of phrases such as “throughout
history” and “as lessons of the past reveal,” and others may suggest Renz
does not sufficiently explore how the Russian leadership has sought to
address the manpower and defense industry problems to which she
points. Moreover, there are noteworthy gaps in the analysis—NATO’s
Libya campaign is hardly mentioned, and the war in eastern Ukraine,
the question of developing the armed forces as part of deterrence, and
the establishment of the National Defense Control Center are all only
very lightly touched upon. The latter is a particularly significant feature
not only of Russian defense but of contemporary state strategy-making.
Reference to more of the significant personalities in the Russian defense
and security sector would also have added color. Nevertheless, this book
offers both a useful critique and solid platform for further developing
thinking about Russia’s military revival—it is recommended reading for
those coming to terms with Moscow’s role on the international stage.
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Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Resurgence and Politicisation
By Ofer Fridman
Reviewed by Dr. Christopher Spearin, professor, Department of Defence Studies
of the Royal Military College of Canada located at the Canadian Forces College

I
New York: Oxford
University Press, 2018
288 pages
$40.00

n his monograph, Ofer Fridman tackles a pressing question given the
current rocky state of the West’s relationship with Russia: even though
the West and Russia employ the term “hybrid warfare,” why do they
still talk past one another? To handle this question, Fridman first offers
the intellectual genealogy of the term for each party before turning to
why the hybrid warfare concept has been weaponized and politicized by
each. This approach speaks both to the growing prominence of the term
among Western and Russian analysts, media outlets, and practitioners and
to why understanding is often a function of comparing apples and oranges.
To expand, the first part considers the trajectory of the intellectual
experience in the West. This approach’s benefit is allowing the
reader to step back and see the forest for the trees. The book initially
highlights Frank Hoffman’s work in the early 2000s, a stance that was
largely military oriented and focused upon the operational level with
no particular adversary in mind. The book explores why this initial
ideational delimitation came about and how, over time, the Western
understanding blossomed to become more multifaceted and to be seen
as ideally descriptive of Russian activities.
The detraction of this approach is that anchoring the text on
Hoffman’s work, however important, does not capture the entire
intellectual experience. True, Fridman recognizes some of Hoffman’s
contemporaries in the second chapter. But this exploration is incomplete
given the light referencing to authors in the second and third chapters that
Hoffman himself identified as important. In short, the reader helpfully
sees the forest, but it may in fact be denser than what is presented.
The second part presents the commensurate Russian experience.
On the one hand, what the reader will find useful here, coming after
the Western presentation, is the resulting appreciation of the wider
nature of gibridnaya voyna (hybrid war) with its emphasis on multiple
actors and avenues for state power and the downplaying of the military
tool. Additionally, the distinction here is worthwhile given the bundling
and overlap of terms—such as new generation warfare, Gerasimov
doctrine, and gray-zone conflict—that Westerners often use to frame
the Russian approach. Put differently, the book contributes to a muchneeded discernment.
On the other hand, the reader will have to look elsewhere to consider
how past Soviet practices play into contemporary Russian thought.
Certainly, Fridman states that he wants to investigate how concepts
impact political events and policy-making rather than the opposite.
He contends the current Russian endeavor does not engage the legacy
of Cold War era “active measures.” Moreover, he asserts the reader
should do likewise: “Remember that while some Russian actions can be
conceptually described as an adaptation of active measures to twentyfirst-century realities, the differences between them are similar to the
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differences between the means and methods of the First and the Second
World Wars” (4). Fair enough, but whereas Fridman’s examination of the
Western conceptual approach dates mostly to developments since the end
of the Cold War, he offers in the Russian context many pages examining
the impact of Evgeny Messner, a thinker born in the nineteenth century.
Perhaps a caveat about applicability is in order here too.
The book’s third part—its most beneficial—reveals how the term
hybrid warfare moved into each camp from the ideational to the political
realms, thus allowing the concept to gain momentum and the differences
between the two approaches to become acute in very public ways. In
Fridman’s framing of the Western case, NATO’s embrace of the concept
and the subsequent framing of Russia through this lens have a threefold
rationale. One is to spur on the organization’s revitalization by confronting
more than just so-called traditional military challenges. Another is to
underscore that NATO is a key defender of Western values. The third
rests largely with the initiative of NATO’s newer Eastern European
members to ensure the organization’s other members appreciate and
respond to the historical fears and the contemporary challenges they
confront. As for the Russian example, though the concept may be much
more expansive in regards to nonmilitary activities, Fridman argues the
Russian military nevertheless advances gibridnaya voyna because it assists
in attracting additional resources to the armed forces overall. What is
more, applying gibridnaya voyna in order to best capture Western activities
vis-à-vis Ukraine and elsewhere helps solidify Russian public opinion
and provide support to Russian political institutions and policies.
Altogether, though one might quibble with how the author has
engaged the intellectual history of hybrid war, the book nevertheless
provides a useful illustration of how the Western and Russian camps
diverge in both their thinking toward a guiding concept and in their
application of it.
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Biography
Omar Nelson Bradley: America’s GI General, 1893–1981
By Steven L. Ossad
Reviewed by Dr. Conrad Crane, chief of historical services of the US Army
Heritage and Education Center, US Army War College.
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o important figure in American military history needs a good
biography more than General of the Army Omar Bradley. He
carefully controlled his narrative while alive, authoring or coauthoring any
books about him, and his second wife, Kitty, carefully guarded his image
after his death. Historians like Martin Blumenson and Rick Atkinson
chipped away some parts of the Bradley façade. But until now, no one has
attempted a comprehensive, objective treatment of the longest-serving
five star general. Steven Ossad is a retired Wall Street technology analyst
who has also written a well-received biography of Major General Maurice
Rose, and this most recent effort won the Society for Military History’s
2018 award for the best military biography. Ossad’s fresh perspective on
Bradley’s early life and military career after World War II has hopefully
launched more contemporary analyses of the general’s impact on the
United States and its Army, but this book will hardly be the last word on
Omar Bradley.
Ossad relies heavily on interviews and accounts by Bradley and his
closest confidants, with particular focus on Thomas Bigland, Bernard
Montgomery’s liaison officer, torn by conflicting loyalties to both Army
Group commanders but very frank in his observations. So it is not
surprising the book is mostly sympathetic to its subject, though Ossad
admits Bradley was vain, took slights very personally, and held grudges
for decades.
The book does very well covering Bradley’s early life and his West
Point career. A skating accident while a youth ruined his teeth, and for
the rest of his life he was concerned about his appearance and reluctant
to smile. At West Point he excelled in sports and his first impressions of
many key subordinates in World War II were established on playing fields
there. He was mentored in his early military career first by Edwin Forrest
Harding and later by George Marshall. Bradley taught mathematics at
West Point and tactics at the Infantry School, building relationships and
his reputation. He proved particularly adept at creating and solidifying
organizations, ranging from the 28th Infantry Division as the war was
beginning, to the II Corps in Tunisia, the 12th Army Group in Northwest
Europe, and the Veteran’s Administration after the war ended.
Ossad argues Bradley was one of the best American corps
commanders of the war, excelling in Tunisia and Sicily, and Dwight
Eisenhower’s best Army Group commander in northwest Europe,
though that comparison is always with Montgomery, ignoring Jacob
Devers. The author also takes every opportunity to deflate the image
of George Patton. Ossad thinks Bradley deserved his moniker of “the
soldier’s general,” though the best evidence offered is just that too many
people believed it for it not to be true.
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While the author admits Bradley was quick to relieve subordinates
that trait is explained away as mimicking George Marshall. Ossad does
not address Daniel Bolger’s accusation of a zero-defects mentality in
Bradley’s commands. The author agrees with critics that Bradley should
have fired First Army commander Courtney Hodges, however. Ossad
also eviscerates Bradley for poor leadership during the Battle of the
Bulge, and assigns him great responsibility for the bombing shortfalls at
the beginning of Operation Cobra. On the other hand, the book quickly
exonerates its subject from any blame for failing to close the Falaise Gap.
The section on the planning for Cobra is well done, showing Bradley
almost as Montgomery, meticulously planning a complicated operation.
The 12th Army Group was the largest field command in American
history, and Bradley deserves much credit for organizing and running
it. Though, as anyone who has read David Eisenhower’s book on his
grandfather at war realizes, by 1945 Ike’s biggest prima donna was not
Patton or Montgomery, it was Bradley.
The most valuable contribution of the book is its coverage of
Bradleys’ tenure as a postwar chief of the Veteran’s Administration,
perhaps his greatest service to the nation. President Harry Truman
tapped the reluctant general to take over the troubled and understaffed
organization facing the return of millions of veterans and mastering the
intricacies of the revolutionary legislation passed to help them, in what
was described as a “frightful bureaucratic challenge.” Truman received
great political dividends from the appointment, while Bradley and Dr.
Paul Hawley, former chief surgeon of the European Theater, created the
“most advanced, accessible, equitable, and sustained health care system
ever established for veterans by any nation or empire” (355). They also
reformed administrative procedures for all Veteran Affairs programs,
as Bradley brought in many of his 12th Army Group staff to help. He
expanded the organization from 65,000 employees to over 200,000.
Some of his impact is still evident, especially in decentralization. But
over time, many of the problems he faced have returned.
Truman then appointed Bradley as first chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. Ossad tries to argue for the general’s impact on that office.
It appears, however, the author was running out of steam, or facing
pressure from his publisher to cut words, because he only really discusses
two events, Bradley’s hostile reaction to the “revolt of the admirals”
and the relief of Douglas MacArthur in Korea. And the coverage of
Bradley’s career after leaving that position from 1953–81 is handled in
three pages.
There is still much to be covered from that period, most very
unflattering to the general. Before his first wife died in 1965, he had an
affair with Kitty—Ossad mentions that, and they were a very contentious
pair who shared a passion for horse racing. They destroyed archival
documents deemed damaging to his image, torpedoed a project to build
a Bradley Center in Carlisle that would have rivaled the MacArthur
Memorial in a dispute over tax write offs for donations, and padded
those donations by buying cheap silver plate that they inscribed with
a “B” and then claimed it was family silver. Hopefully, other authors
will now follow Ossad’s lead and delve even deeper into the career and
impact of this complex and important figure.
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The First Soldier: Hitler as Military Leader
By Stephen G. Fritz
Reviewed by Dr. Richard L. DiNardo, USMC Command and Staff College
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ndoubtedly, one of the most written about figures of the twentieth
century is Adolf Hitler. The work under consideration here ranks as
an excellent addition to that corpus of literature. The focus of Stephen
Fritz, one of the more astute observers of the military history of the
Third Reich, is on Hitler’s career as a military leader.
Fritz begins with Hitler’s understanding of military theory and
history. Hitler was thoroughly conversant with the concepts of Carl von
Clausewitz, and was also familiar, though how much remains debatable,
with the geopolitical ideas of Karl Haushofer. A true autodidact, Hitler
also read a fair amount of military history, economics, and the racist
tracts of Volkisch writers. Some of this reading served Hitler well later
as a military leader in that, as Fritz suggests, he generally had a better
understanding of economics than his generals.
Perhaps the most written about aspect of Hitler’s activity in World
War II by military historians concerns his relationship with his generals.
Fritz delves into this area with his considerable acuity, and emerges with
some very nuanced arguments. Ideologically, Hitler had little opposition
to brook. The majority of German generals shared much of Hitler’s
ideological outlook, as well as his expansionist and exterminationist aims.
On operational matters, Hitler more often than not, as Fritz points
out, was willing to defer to his generals, even during the latter half of
the war. While Hitler did not necessarily serve his subordinates well,
Fritz argues Hitler was not well served by his subordinates either. The
most notable person who comes in for rough treatment in this regard is
Franz Halder. Chief of the General Staff from September 1938 until his
dismissal in September 1942, Halder was in many ways the antithesis of
Hitler militarily.
A professional soldier, Halder had spent his career in a long line
of staff positions. The quintessential Frontkämpfer, Hitler was never
averse to throwing his frontline service in Halder’s face, suggesting he
knew more about war than many of his generals. As a staff officer and
operational thinker, Fritz’s picture of Halder is unflattering, to say the
least. Stolid and unimaginative, Halder was often unscrupulous enough
to withhold information from Hitler, which he might have found useful
in making decisions.
Operationally, Fritz notes Hitler, as even such postwar critics as
Erich von Manstein agreed, was capable of the occasional shrewd insight.
Hitler could read a map as well as many professional officers, and could
offer well considered analysis of situations. What he often lacked was
the kind of professional knowledge when it came to the management of
large scale movements and what was possible to accomplish.
Oddly, Hitler and his generals shared two principal faults as military
leaders. The first was a lack of understanding of strategy. While Hitler
had a clear, if horrifying vision of what the post war world should look
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like, he had no clear notion of how to get there. Hitler’s blindness in this
area was shared by his military advisors. Although many were graduates
of the vaunted Kriegs Akademie, the school’s curriculum—the only
professional military education an officer received in his career—
remained focused at the operational and tactical levels. Thus, after
Operation Barbarossa faltered and the United States entered the war,
neither Hitler nor his military advisors had the foggiest notion of how
to proceed. Commanders themselves, most notably Manstein, at times
confused strategy with operations. This was especially true during his
time as commander of Army Group South, especially after the defeat
at Kursk.
Another problematic area was logistics. While Hitler understood
macroeconomics much better than his generals, he did not understand
logistics, and the impact that logistics could have on operations. In this,
however, Hitler was not alone. The planning and conduct of German
military operations in both world wars was marked by the bad habit
of often waving away potential logistical problems, seemingly believing
such issues would solve themselves. This approach, often based on
faulty assumptions, eventually bore more risk than the Germans could
deal with, especially when operations had to be conducted in areas with
poor or underdeveloped infrastructure.
While coalition warfare was more the province of Hitler the Führer
as opposed to Hitler the Feldherr, the subject gets very little play in
the book. This is unfortunate, given the critical role Axis forces were
earmarked to play in the 1942 campaign in Russia.
Ultimately, the picture of Hitler that emerges from Fritz’s work is a
very nuanced one. Although Hitler remained the committed ideologue
to the end, even late in the war he could still come up with gifted insight.
Too often, however, this was followed by raving self-delusion, which
served to undermine whatever advantage may have been gained from the
previous insight. This work, marked by the kind of meticulous research
and well-supported argument that we have come to expect from Fritz, is
a most welcome addition to the pantheon of World War II scholarship.
Students of command and leadership at the highest levels, both in and
out of uniform, will profit from this outstanding work.

The Spy and the Traitor, The Greatest
Espionage Story of the Cold War
By Ben Macintyre
Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, Professor Emeritus, US Army War College.

C

olonel Oleg Gordievsky of the Soviet intelligence service, KGB,
was one of the most important Western spies in Cold War history.
He was of incomparable value to the British intelligence service, MI6,
and thru them to the CIA. Both President Ronald Reagan and British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher were provided with his secrets and
found them to be important for the shaping of their foreign policies.
Gordievsky’s personal story is also compelling, and is told brilliantly in

New York: Crown, 2018
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$28.00
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this volume, which legendary author John Le Carre’ describes on the
book’s dustjacket as “the best true spy story I have ever read.”
As a KGB junior officer, there was no indication that Gordievsky
would eventually turn against the Soviet system and become a British
spy. Rather, the organization viewed him as politically reliable and noted
that his father and older brother served as career members of Soviet
intelligence. Nevertheless, over time, Gordievsky’s convictions about
protecting the Soviet system were shaken by that country’s ruthless
actions. During his initial service as an overseas operative, he witnessed
the construction of the Berlin Wall, and was shocked at the brutality
used to prevent East Germans from escaping to the West. He was later
equally concerned over the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which
appeared to underscore Soviet hostility to any loosening of ideological
rigidity within the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states.
Yet, perhaps the most significant event in Gordievsky’s questioning
of the Soviet system was his three-year overseas assignment to
Copenhagen. There he thrived in an atmosphere of personal freedom,
societal cheerfulness, and cultural openness, where he could indulge his
passion for classical music, much of which was forbidden in the Soviet
Union. As Soviet dogma became more threadbare to him, Gordievsky
became disillusioned. His return to Moscow after his initial tour of
Denmark only reinforced his contempt for the values of Soviet ideology.
Later, on a second tour as an intelligence agent in Copenhagen, he made
a series of oblique and subtle moves signaling that he was willing to
work with MI6. When contacted by the British, Gordievsky indicated
that he would serve as an ideological spy and initially refused to take
money from them.
After service as a useful intelligence asset in Denmark, Gordievsky
returned to Moscow, and his intelligence activities on behalf of MI6
essentially went dormant. British security officials believed that any
intelligence collection activities in the Soviet Union would probably be
doomed to failure as a result of the massive Soviet counterintelligence
system within their own country. Unfortunately, Gordievsky’s prospects
for a new overseas assignment also seemed dim. His decision to divorce
his ideologically committed wife and marry a younger woman seriously
hurt his career and seemed to have condemned him to a career of
intelligence drudgery with little prospect of promotion.
To dig himself out of these difficulties, he began to learn English.
Eventually, after some bureaucratic maneuvering, Gordievsky was
able to get himself assigned to the Soviet Embassy in London, where
he was to serve as a Soviet intelligence agent under diplomatic cover.
Unfortunately for the KGB, he quickly reestablished his relationship
with MI6 in London, and began secretly meeting with his handlers. One
of the more amusing aspects of this book is how British intelligence
struggled to come up with ways to advance Gordievsky’s career once
he had been assigned to London, including finding pretexts to deport
troublesome superiors and rivals. MI6 also supplied Gordievsky with
some intelligence tidbits of limited value, which they called “chickenfeed,”
to pass along to his Moscow superiors and thereby prove his value at
developing a network of secret agents. In return, MI6 was able to gain
material of tremendous value from Gordievsky including intelligence
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on Soviet operations throughout the United Kingdom and Scandinavia
including Soviet attempts to meddle in British elections.
Macintyre maintains that some of the most valuable information
Gordievsky provided to the West came during the build up to 1983
NATO exercise Operation Able Archer in Europe. This exercise
simulated an escalating conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty
Organization that culminated with the wargame’s mock use of nuclear
weapons. The wargame came at a time when the Soviet Union was led by
the deeply paranoid former KGB chief, Yuri Andropov, who was fearful
of a US first strike by President Reagan. MI6 told the CIA that the
KGB, which was anxious to please Andropov, assessed that the exercise
was a prelude to the outbreak of war and that it was being used as a
cover for the build-up to war. An internal CIA summary of Able Archer
conducted years later assessed that these fears could have caused the
situation to escalate, and “Gordievsky’s timely warning to Washington
via MI6 kept things from going too far” (182).
The traitor referenced in the title of this book is not Gordievsky,
whom Macintyre considers a hero. Rather, it is rogue CIA officer
Aldrich Ames who chose to address his ongoing financial difficulties
by selling CIA secrets to the Soviet Union. These secrets included the
identities of Soviet officials working for the CIA or MI6. While MI6
had never provided Gordievsky’s name to the CIA, the organization’s
analysts were able to deduce it through a number of clues based on
the intelligence passed on from the British. Gordievsky’s identity was
included as one of a number of agents betrayed to the Soviets and caused
his immediate recall from London to Moscow.
As a KGB colonel, Gordievsky could not be imprisoned or tortured
without strong evidence, but he was placed under intense surveillance
and interrogated with drugs in an apparently unsuccessful effort to
break him. Under these circumstances, Gordievsky chose to implement
a longshot plan previously agreed upon with MI6. This plan involved
an effort to escape from the Soviet Union via Finland. MI6 had never
before exfiltrated a Soviet agent from their own country, and it seemed
nearly impossible for them to do so this time. Consequently, the final
portion of the book makes exceptionally exciting reading as it describes
Gordievsky’s desperate effort to escape.
Macintyre has written a number of previous books about espionage
including three focused on World War II as well as an excellent biography
of MI6 traitor Kim Philby. Consequently, the author knows a great deal
about intelligence tradecraft and is effective and colorful at describing
the mechanics of Gordievsky’s actions as a KGB/ MI6 operative and the
nature of the plan for him to escape from the Soviet Union (which the
Soviets became aware of after the fact). In sum, this book is a pleasure
to read as well as an important scholarly achievement that adds vital
perspective on a number of aspects of the Cold War.
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1777: Tipping Point at Saratoga
By Dean Snow
Reviewed by Dr. Gregory J. W. Urwin, professor of history, Temple University
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he Saratoga Campaign of 1777, which culminated in the surrender
of 5,856 British, German, and Loyalist troops under Lieutenant
General John Burgoyne, is generally hailed as the turning point in the
American War of Independence—the victory that persuaded France,
the mightiest power in Europe, to enter the conflict on the side of the
infant United States. In this fast-paced history, Dean Snow focuses on 33
crucial days that fell between September 15 and October 17, 1777. That
period witnessed the jarring general engagements at Freeman’s Farm
(September 19) and Bemis Heights (October 7) in which Major General
Horatio Gates’ mixed army of Continental regulars and militia from New
England and New York bested its opponents and then subjected them to
a siege that robbed Burgoyne of all hope.
Dean Snow is a professor emeritus of anthropology at Penn State
University and an archaeologist by training. His interest in Saratoga
dates to 1971, when he was a young assistant professor at the University
of Albany. The National Park Service asked him to participate in the
first of a series of archaeological projects at the Saratoga battlefield in
preparation for the bicentennial festivities that would be held there six
years later. For the next 45 years, Snow would survey the ground over
which Burgoyne and Gates’ troops fought, examine the artifacts yielded
by various archaeological digs, and immerse himself in the letters, diaries,
reports, and memoirs left by the Saratoga campaign’s participants.
Snow’s 1777 is both a labor of love and the result of intensive research.
Surprisingly, Snow did not produce the kind of exacting statisticsridden, jargon-laden report that has become the hallmark of battlefield
archaeology. He aims his book at a mass audience by crafting it as a
narrative that conveys how the crucial phase of the Saratoga campaign
was experienced by a few dozen participants. Snow characterizes his
treatment as a microhistory, but it bridges the gap between microhistory
and macrohistory. His cast of characters includes humble enlisted
men and junior officers, along with battalion, brigade, wing, and army
commanders. Snow tells his story through the eyes of these selected
participants. His book is a tapestry of interwoven vignettes, each based
on the accounts of one or more eyewitnesses. Snow keeps his material
under tight control, permitting the reader to hop from one perspective
to another without confusion, which is no small feat.
Authors of narrative history rely on observers who leave vivid
testimony. Unfortunately, some of the most compelling anecdotes are
spun by untrustworthy parties, and a historian needs to resist being
seduced by suspect sources simply because they read so well. Snow makes
this mistake with his heavy reliance on the memoirs left by Lieutenant
Colonel James Wilkinson, Gates’s 20-year-old adjutant general. Snow
acknowledges Wilkinson was an unprincipled opportunist who would
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later betray his country to the Spanish after he attained high command
in the US Army. Nevertheless, the author still takes a lot of what that
untrustworthy rogue said at face value. The fact that Wilkinson’s position
enabled him to observe some of the most crucial events at Saratoga
makes this inevitable, but one does not always know when the young
staff officer spoke the truth or not.
For the most part, however, Snow handles his sources judiciously.
He also treats the opposing forces at Saratoga with admirable objectivity.
Snow believes any authentic history of the Revolutionary War must
emphasize human endurance, and he empathizes with the soldiers on
both sides as they faced a multiplicity of challenges and dangers. He
also avoids the temptation of placing any of the senior commanders on
pedestals. John Burgoyne comes across as a man driven by unflagging
optimism until he finally realizes it is too late to save his beleaguered army.
Snow paints a complex portrait of Horatio Gates. Gates owed his
rise in the Continental chain of command to the fact that he had served
previously in the British army, and to his penchant for intrigue and
political manipulation. His conduct throughout the campaign tended
to be cautious, but that was sometimes dictated by valid logistical
considerations. Major General Benedict Arnold receives the credit he
richly deserved for the frenzied leadership and tactical acumen that broke
Burgoyne’s army at Freeman’s Farm, but Snow resists the temptation to
over romanticize the future traitor. He deftly highlights the overriding
ambition, tactless zeal, prickly sense of honor, and quarrelsomeness that
made Arnold a difficult subordinate.
Snow’s description of battles and troop movements are supplemented
by numerous maps, which makes it easy for readers to follow the action.
On the other hand, however, he offers little analysis of the events he
reconstructs with such panache. He seems content to tell his story and let
his readers draw their own conclusions. Those who prefer their history in
the form of entertainment will find 1777: Tipping Point at Saratoga to their
liking. Those with an interest in material culture will be disappointed by
the many mistakes Snow makes in his depiction of Burgoyne’s Redcoats.
Snow also misses an opportunity to make an important point
regarding the development of the Continental Army. According to a longcherished myth, the American regulars who bore the brunt of combat
during the war’s major battles did not acquire the skill and confidence to
meet their British foes on equal terms until they underwent the ingenious
training regimen orchestrated by Major General Friedrich, Baron von
Steuben, at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, during the winter of 1777–78.
The problem with that interpretation is the Valley Forge encampment
occurred after the British surrender at Saratoga. While Snow realizes
Gates’s Continentals proved more than a match for Burgoyne’s Redcoats,
Germans, and Loyalists at Saratoga, he neglects to explain why. That will
have to wait for a future retelling of this decisive campaign.
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